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JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(i), this Court has
jurisdiction over "final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with . . . the Public Service Commission
. . ."

The PSC's February 20, 1992, Order was a final order.

Sandy City ("Sandy") and White City Water Company ("WCWC")
(collectively referred to as "Petitioners") filed a Petition for
Review and/or Reconsideration with the PSC on March 11, 1992, and
that Petition was denied on April 8, 1992. (R. 389). Having thus
exhausted their administrative remedies, Petitioners filed an
appeal with this Court. (R. 394). Despite this, Petitioners claim
that this Court does not have jurisdiction and that the PSC's order
was not final. The PSC's decision concerning its jurisdiction was
final and this Court has been asked to consider the PSC's decision.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

II.

WAS IT APPROPRIATE FOR THE PSC TO HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE WHITE CITY WATER USERS?

RETAINED

A.

DO APPLICABLE STATUTES AND CONTROLLING CASE LAW
ALLOW THE PSC TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER WCWC
AND ITS PROPOSED PURCHASER, SANDY?

B.

DOES UTAH'S CONSTITUTION ALLOW THE PSC TO EXERCISE
JURISDICTION OVER SANDY IF IT PURCHASES WCWC?

C.

WOULD SANDY'S SALE OF WATER TO NON-RESIDENT WATER
USERS BE A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION?

D.

WAS THE PSC CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT THE
ACQUISITION OF WCWC AND THE SALE OF WATER TO NONSANDY RESIDENTS WAS NOT THE SALE OF "SURPLUS"
WATER?

DID THE PSC BASE ITS DECISION UPON LEGAL AND FACTUAL
EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM THE PARTIES?

III. IS THE PSC'S ORDER FINAL?
1

STANDARD OF APPEI*LATE REVIEW
In its review process, this Court is entitled to consider the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the PSC and the
administrative record.

Even the cases cited1 by Petitioners allow

this Court to consider the PSC's decision and the underlying
record.

Relying upon the cases cited by Petitioners, significant

deference should be given to the PSC. Since there is more than one
permissible readiji(g_jaf__the applicable statutes and no basis in the
statutory or legislative history to prefer one interpretation over
another, the PSC is entitled to deference.
Confer. 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983).

Salt Lake City v.

As the Utah Supreme Court said

in Morton International. Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581
(Utah 1991),
. . . an appellate court should not substitute its
judgment for the agency's judgment concerning the wisdom of
the agency's policy.
Where there is no discernible
legislative
intent concerning
a specific
issue the
legislature, has in effect, left the issue unresolved. In
such a case, it is appropriate to conclude that the
legislature has delegated authority to the agency to decide
the issue. Such an approach is particularly appropriate when
it is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended the
agency to have some discretion in dealing with the statutory
provision at issue.
Id. at 589.
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Actf which governed
the proceedings before the PSC, the applicable

standard of review

is "substantial evidence."

1

MCI v. Public Service Commission, 286 Utah Adv. Rep. 8
(1992); Savage Industries Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811
P.2d 664 (Utah 1991);
Morton International Inc. v. Auditing
Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners began the process before the PSC by entering into
an October 8, 1992, agreement wherein Sandy would acquire the stock
of WCWC and would provide water service to WCWC customers.
79).

(R.

As a pre-condition to the closing, the PSC had to relinquish

jurisdiction

over

Sandy's

customers.

(R. 79).

service

of

water

to

non-resident

In furtherance of this pre-condition,

Petitioners filed an Application with the PSC on or about October
31, 1992, formally requesting the PSC to relinquish jurisdiction.
(R. 79). The PSC gathered factual information and legal memoranda
on this issue and then concluded that it had to retain jurisdiction
in order to protect the rights of the non-resident White City Water
Users.

(R. 302). Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration

and after consideration the PSC denied the Motion.

(R. 360-388).

Petitioners then filed an appeal with this Court and sought a
summary disposition of the matter.

This request was denied.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At the heart of this case is Sandy's attempt to acquire WCWC,
a utility currently regulated by the PSC, absent accountability to
the PSC or to its water users concerning rates it will charge these
customers.

The affected water users reside outside the political

boundaries of incorporated Sandy and have no power to affect Sandy
decision-makers at the polls. In the past, these water users could
seek redress before the PSC.

Sandy has sought to eliminate this

historic avenue from these residents by conditioning its purchase

3

of WCWC on the PSC's agreement not to retain jurisdiction over the
sale of water to these water users.
The PSC specifically rejected this attempt by Sandy, stating
that it would retain jurisdiction in order to protect the rights of
the

White

City

Water

Users.

Sandy

has

asserted

it

was

inappropriate for the PSC to retain jurisdiction based upon the
claim that by operation of the contract of sale, Sandy would
somehow be supplying "surplus" water to WCWC customers.

However,

Sandy would not be acquiring "surplus" water, it would be acquiring
the water rights of an existing water company, water rights whose
beneficial use was made by the very customers Sandy seeks to
disenfranchise.

Furthermore, a municipality may sell "surplus"

water outside its boundaries which it does not need, but it is not
obligated, nor may it be required to do so for the long term.

If

Sandy were selling "surplus" water, then the White City Water Users
have no guarantee of the continued service they currently receive
from WCWC.

They would be trading a stable, guaranteed source of

supply for a contingent one, subject to the whims and caprices of
a political entity over which they have no control.
Sandy also claims that the PSC should have taken more evidence
on whether the sale was in the public interest.

As the PSC

appropriately determined, the issues of jurisdiction and public
interest concerning the ultimate advisability of the sale are
separate and distinct.

Even if the sale was determined to be in

the public interest, it does not follow that the PSC should give up
jurisdiction to regulate rates charged by Sandy. A sale initially
4

in the public interest could immediately become offensive if there
is no mechanism in place to limit rates Sandy can charge these
customers or to ensure continued water supply over the long term.
Sandy has already admitted it will charge higher rates to the WCWC
water users than are charged to customers within the incorporated
areas.

1/15/92 Sandy Memorandum at p. 4.

The truth is that absent PSC control, Sandy would have the
ability to charge these captive water users outrageously high rates
without fear of reprisal.

Of equal importance is the salient fact

that Sandy voluntarily conditioned its purchase of WCWC upon the
PSC's decision to relinquish jurisdiction.
occur.

This event did not

Unless the contract is amended, there will be no sale,

public interest or not.

On that basis, the PSC's decision

represents a significant savings of time and effort for all
concerned.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The geographical area served by WCWC is contiguous to and

lies partly within Sandy and partly within the unincorporated area
of Salt Lake County.
2.

Of the 3,650 customers currently served by WCWC, 42% (or

1533) of the customers are located within the municipal boundaries
of Sandy and 58% (or 2117) are located in Salt Lake County outside
Sandy's municipal boundaries.
3.

On or about October 8, 1991, Petitioners entered into a

contractual arrangement wherein Sandy would acquire the stock of
WCWC and would provide water service to WCWC customers.
5

(R. 79).

4. Article VII of the contract stated that prior to closing:
The PSC shall have issued an order which has become final
and non-appealable, acceptable to the City, in its sole
discretion, including at least the following:
(a)
authorizing the sale
Shareholders of the Authority;

of

the

Shares

by

the

(b) confirming that subsequent to the Closing the PSC
will not have jurisdiction over the rates, fees, charges,
services or practices of the Company, the Authority or the
City as a result of the purchase of the Shares of the
Authority, or the lease of the System by the City under the
Lease and Assignment; and
(c) contain no restrictions or conditions on possible
reorganizations of the Company, including a requirement to
liquidate the Company. (R. 79).
5. In furtherance of the contract, WCWC filed an Application
with the PSC on or about October 31, 1991.

(R. 79).

The

Application sought approval from the PSC of the October 8, 1991,
contract between WCWC and Sandy, by which Sandy would acquire the
stock

of

WCWC.

(R.

79).

The

Application

also

sought

a

determination by the PSC that it would not retain jurisdiction over
WCWC after it was acquired by Sandy, by asking that the PSC approve
the contract and find that the integrated system constitutes a
municipal water system . . . (R. 79; Application at p. 7). WCWC is
currently regulated by the PSC pursuant to a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity No. 1121 is sued on May 11, 1955.

(R.

80; Application at p. 2).
6.

The Application further stated that WCWC had attempted to

"get permission to construct additional storage facilities on
property which it owns in Sandy City and which is of sufficient
elevation to provide adequate pressure," but that Sandy "has been
6

unwilling to grant a variance from zoning ordinances to permit the
construction of such storage facilities . . . " (R. 79; Application
at p. at 5).
7.

On November 7, 1991, Sandy filed a Petition to Intervene

in the matter.

(R. 143). A Petition to Intervene was filed by the

White City Water Users on November 26, 1991, and by Salt Lake
County on December 26, 1991.

(R. 150; R. 164).

All of these

parties were allowed to intervene and comprise the parties before
the PSC and this Court.
8.

(R. 158).

By a January 10, 1992, Order, the PSC set up a discovery

schedule and requested that the parties submit briefs addressing
the legal authority of the PSC to oversee rates charged to WCWC
customers if Sandy were to acquire WCWC.
9.

(R. 164).

On or about January 15, 1992, Sandy filed a Memorandum of

Law Concerning Commission's Jurisdiction. In the Memorandum, Sandy
stated that it anticipated providing service to customers within
its city limits at the same rate, but that:
. . . As with other non-resident customers of Sandy City, the
White City customers not residing within the city limits will
be charged higher rates than those charged to Sandy residents
to reflect the fact that those non-resident customers are not
a part of Sandy City's tax base and to reflect the cost to
Sandy City of acquiring the system and providing service to
those customers. . . .
(R. 175 to 300; Memorandum at pp. 3-4) (emphasis added).
10.

On February 18, 1992, the PSC heard oral arguments and

two days later issued an Order Severing Proceeding and Report and
Order. The PSC's decision was based upon legal memoranda and

7

factual evidence from the parties, as well as the oral arguments
heard on February 18, 1992.
11.

(R. 302; Order at p. 2).

In its Order, the PSC declared that it "has jurisdiction

over a municipality to the extent it provides retail water service
outside its boundaries as a general business."

(R. 341-343; Order

at p. 1).
12.

Among other things, this decision was based upon the

PSC's determination that Sandy's proposal "would leave a number of
customers, who have had recourse to the Commission for grievances,
effectively without recourse to any entity, public or private.
Given that stark fact, we refuse to take the *all or nothing'
choice presented by Applicant. . . . "

(R. 341-343; Order at p. at

3-4).
13.

The PSC in its Order further stated that:

. . . In reaching this conclusion, we believe the salient
considerations include disenfranchisement of the extraterritorial customers, Sandy's limited statutory powers, the
structure of the transaction, our doubts that service outside
the city boundaries would constitute exercise of a municipal
function, and our skepticism that Sandy would indeed be
selling surplus water as contemplated by the Utah statutes.
(R. 341-343; Order at p. 4).
14.

On March 11, 1992, Sandy filed a Petition for Review

and/or Reconsideration with the PSC and brief in support thereof.
(R. 360-388).
15.

On April 8, 1992, the PSC issued an Order Denying Review

because the " . . . Petitions for review and/or rehearing, submitted
by the Applicant [WCWC] and Intervenor, Sandy City Corporation,

8

raise no issues we have not already considered . . ."

(R. 389;

Order at p. 1).

ARGUMENT
I.

THE PSC HAS APPROPRIATELY RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER THE
WHITE CITY WATER USERS

Sandy conditioned its purchase of WCWC upon the PSC's decision
not to retain jurisdiction over the White City Water Users and
approached the PSC with this request.
the rules for the game.

It was Sandy who selected

By electing to proceed as it did, Sandy

had no guarantees that the PSC would decide in its favor. Now that
the PSC has elected to retain jurisdiction in opposition to Sandy's
request, Sandy has appealed the PSC's decision to this Court.
Contrary to Petitioners7 suggestions, it is common practice
for courts and administrative agencies to make a determination of
jurisdiction before ever reaching other matters. Petitioners have
blended jurisdiction with other issues in an attempt avoid this
basic flaw of their position.

The PSC's decision to retain

jurisdiction is well reasoned, well researched and evidences its
careful consideration of all memoranda and evidence presented to
it# including that from Sandy and WCWC
A.

Applicable Statutes and Controlling Case Law Allow
the PSC to Exercise Jurisdiction Over WCWC and its
Proposed Purchaser, Sandy

In their Brief, Petitioners claim that the PSC is a "creature
of

the

legislature"

and

is

delegated to it by statute."

limited

to

"powers

specifically

Petitioners' Brief at 14. This is

9

true, but Petitioners are in the same position.

Their powers are

circumscribed by statute as well.
In deciding to retain jurisdiction, the PSC concluded that it
would proceed "on the premise that if Sandy takes over the utility
service of

[WCWC] # the city must also take on the utility/s

obligations."

2/20/92 PSC Order at p. 5.

As the Utah Supreme

Court said in North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co. ,
223 P.2d 577 (Utah 1950), North Salt Lake, the condemnor of a water
company, was required to take on the obligations imposed upon the
water company.

In their Brief, Petitioners misconstrue the

propositions of that case which were relied upon by the PSC.
According to the Utah Supreme Court in North Salt Lake, supra. ".
. . when the town condemned the entire system of the water company,
the rights and privileges that extended to, and the obligations
imposed upon the water company were carried over and the town is
required to meet those obligations. . . . "

Id. at 583.

Here,

Sandy is attempting to acquire all of the benefits of WCWC absent
accountability to those water users for the rates it charges.

If

Sandy takes over a PSC regulated utility and services non-resident
customers, regulation by the PSC should continue.
Similarly, in City of Orangeburg v. Moss. 204 S.E.2d 377 (S.C.
1974),

the

South

Carolina

Supreme

Court

upheld

the

constitutionality of legislation empowering the PSC to regulate
extra-territorial service.
jurisdiction

to

regulate

The Court concluded that the PSC had
a municipality

operating

electrical

facilities outside it boundaries. In reaching this conclusion that
10

court

determined

municipalities

to

the

constitutional

operate

electrical

grant

of

facilities

power
was

not

to
a

limitation on the power of the State to regulate those activities,
whether through the PSC or otherwise.
Petitioners have attempted to negate the importance of the
Orangeburg ruling by stating that South Carolina had legislation in
place allowing the PSC to regulate extra-territorial service by a
municipality. The case, however, is of great significance because
the South Carolina Supreme Court was considering whether it was
constitutional

for the PSC to have jurisdiction

over extra-

territorial service by the PSC# which is precisely the issue
presented to the Court in the instant appeal. As the Utah Supreme
Court stated in Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P. 2d 119
(Utah 1977), neither the Utah legislature by statute, nor Utah
judges through case law, have determined whether the PSC may
regulate extra-territorial service by a municipality.

Id. at 122.

Petitioners have consistently claimed that Utah law prohibits the
PSC

from

regulating

inaccurate.

Sandy

in

this

situation,

but

this

is

There has yet to be a decision on this issue.

Petitioners7 Brief shows a lack of respect for the PSC's
authority to protect customers and demonstrates the need for that
protection to continue.

The PSC has statutory authority to

regulate public utilities and to take necessary measures to carry
out its duties to protect consumers.

As the Utah Supreme Court

stated in the case of White River Shale Oil v. Public Service
Commission. 700 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1985):
11

The PSC has been charged with the responsibility of
regulating utilities in the public interest and has
considerable latitude of discretion to carry out that
responsibility. Under the authority of U.C.A., 1953,
§54-4-1 (Supp. 1983), the PSC has the power to issue
orders regarding any matter within its jurisdiction
[footnotes omitted].
Id. at 1091 (emphasis added).
The track record of Sandy demonstrates its willingness to
charge

higher

rates

to

those

located

outside

its

municipal

boundaries and that those rates are not necessarily based upon
actual cost of service.

Sandy has publicly indicated that the

White

located

City Water Users

outside of Sandy's municipal

boundaries will experience a significant increase in their rates
for the avowed purpose of assisting Sandy in retiring the bonds
issued for the purchase of the assets of WCWC and to compensate
Sandy simply because they are non-taxpayers.

" . . . the White

City customers not residing within the city limits will be charged
higher rates than those charged to Sandy residents . . . "

Sandy's

1/15/92, Memorandum of Law at p. 4.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Kearns-Tribune v. Public
Service Commission, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah 1984) supports the PSC's
decision to protect the White City Water Users from excessive rates
charged by Sandy.

According to the Utah Supreme Court, ". . .

[a]ny activities of a utility that actually affect its rate
structure would necessarily be subject to some degree to the PSC's
broad supervisory powers in relation to rates. . . . "

Id. at 860.

Since Sandy has admitted the rates of non-resident White City Water
Users will increase and that Sandy does not intend to allow for PSC
12

oversight of the rates, this proposed sale constitutes an activity
that will affect the rate structure of this utility and therefore
must be managed by the PSC.

Given these facts, it is not

unreasonable for Sandy to be regulated for rates charged to
customers residing outside the city limits; in fact, it is quite
desirable.
B.

It

is

The PSC is Not Prohibited by Utah's Constitution
From Exercising Jurisdiction Over Sandy if it
Purchases WCWC
true

that

Article

VI, Section

28

of

the

Utah

Constitution limits the authority of the Legislature to delegate
powers of a municipality to a special commission. This provision,
however, does not prohibit the PSC from regulating a municipality
that acquires a regulated entity that serves customers located
outside its municipal boundaries.

That constitutional provision

provides that:
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association, any power
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal
improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol
site, or to perform any municipal functions.
Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 28.
In support of their claim that Article VI, Section 28
prohibits the PSC from regulating Sandy after it purchases WCWC, a
currently regulated facility, Petitioners inappropriately rely upon
County Water System v. Salt Lake County. 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954).
That case concerned a lawsuit by a water corporation seeking a
declaration that Salt Lake City must be regulated by the PSC in
selling and distributing water beyond its city limits.
13

County

Water. supra. and the present case are distinguishable.

In County

Water, Salt Lake City was acquiring water for the present and
future needs of its residents.

In the instant case# Sandy is

acquiring WCWC in order that it may continue to serve water to the
White City Water Users.

It will not be providing surplus water

that its residents do not need, but rather Sandy will be taking
over

an

existing

water

company

and

serving

its

customers.

Furthermore, Sandy's refusal to allow WCWC to construct additional
storage facilities on property which WCWC owns in Sandy appears to
be one of the reasons WCWC agreed to sell its facilities to Sandy.
WCWC's 10/31/91, Application at p. 5.
The more recent case, Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570
P.2d 119 (Utah 1977), makes Petitioners mistaken reliance upon
County Water even more clear. According to the Utah Supreme Court
in Salt Lake County, supra, it is not certain to what "extent a
city may engage in rendering a utility service outside its city
limits without being subject to some public regulation. . . " Id.
at 122.

It is true that the PSC cannot regulate a city's utility

service

within

its

boundaries, but

contrary

to Petitioners'

statements, the Utah Supreme Court has not determined whether the
PSC may regulate a municipality

acquiring a regulated entity

outside its municipal boundaries.

Id. at 121-122.

Given the underlying circumstances of the present case and the
applicable

statutes, the PSC appropriately

determined

it had

authority to regulate Sandy after it acquired WCWC, a regulated
utility.
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C.

Sandy's Sale to Non-Resident Water Users is Not a
Municipal Function

Sandy's proposed service to extra-territorial customers is not
a municipal function, particularly in light of the circumstances
underlying this case.

Sandy would be selling water to customers

outside its municipal boundaries; has admitted that it will charge
higher rates to WCWC customers; and conditioned its contract with
WCWC upon the PSC not retaining jurisdiction over Sandy. 10/31/91
Application of WCWC at p. 5; 1/15/92, Memorandum at p. 4; 10/8/91,
Contract at Article VII.
Given this information, it is clear that Sandy contemplates
providing water service to the White City Water Users as a business
proposition and not as an incident to the water service of that
municipality.

Thus, the acquisition and ultimate service outside

of the municipal boundaries of Sandy cannot be construed as a
"municipal function" so as to place it within the exemption sought
by Petitioners and to concomitantly avoid PSC regulation.
Several recent Utah cases have discussed the application of
the term "municipal function" in similar contexts.

Contrary to

Petitioner's statements, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems
v. Public Service Commission, 789 P.2d 298 (Utah 1990), is a case
that must be considered

in the analysis

and which supports

Appellees' rather than Petitioners' position.

In that case, the

Utah Supreme Court considered the claim of the Utah Associated
Municipal Power Systems ("UAMPS") that Article VI, Section 28 of
the Utah Constitution was violated when UAMPS, an entity composed
of local government agencies, was required to obtain a certificate
15

of convenience and necessity from the PSC.

UAMPS' aim was to

construct generating and transmission facilities.

Under the Utah

Interlocal Co-operation Act (Utah Code Ann. §11-13-1 et seq.),
UAMPS had the same power, privileges and authority accorded its
individual political subdivisions. UAMPS resisted the jurisdiction
of the PSC based upon the theory that these political subdivisions
were exercising municipal functions, even though part of their
service area was located outside the boundaries of the abovementioned political subdivisions.
In deciding whether UAMPs was engaged in a municipal function,
the Court stated that:
The "function" we are considering here is not the
mere construction of a transmission line by a utility
owned by a single municipality to serve its own municipal
customers. It is the construction of a transmission line
by a political subdivision of the state that combines
more than twenty cities, towns, and local agencies
throughout the state of Utah for the purpose of
generating, buying, and selling electricity across the
state. * . . Moreover, UAMPS' proposed line is designed
to open up new areas for the wholesaling of electricity
to municipalities now served by UP&L, with possibly
severe economic consequences for UP&L and its customers
statewide. We have little difficulty finding that the
construction of this line by UAMPS is "sufficiently
infused with a state, as opposed to an exclusively local,
interest to escape characterization as [a] *municipal
function[]'." (citations omitted).
789 P.2d at 302 (citing City of West Jordan. 767 P.2d at 534).
In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that PSC jurisdiction must be
imposed due to the potential detrimental effect upon those beyond
the boundaries of municipalities and for the reason that the State
and the PSC had a better ability than any municipality to consider
the interests of all those outside the boundaries who may be
16

adversely affected by the project. A similar problem is posed in
the instant matter.
The Supreme Court rejected UAMPS' interpretation of Article
VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution since UAMPS was "defining
anything having to do with the operation of a municipal utility as
a

%

municipal function,' the performance of which is beyond the

reach of state regulation. . . . Id. at 301.

Petitioners have

incorrectly attempted to reach a like result..
In UAMPS, supra, the court determined that the construction of
the proposed power lines by UAMPS had far reaching impacts beyond
the boundaries of UAMPS' members and that the PSC was in the best
position to consider the interests of customers outside the
boundaries.

Id. at 303.

The same is true in the instant case.

The PSC is in the best position to consider and protect the
interests of Sandy's extra-territorial water customers.

The PSC

would not interfere with Sandy's day-to-day management of WCWC, but
would provide a forum for the non-resident customers' complaints
and act as a necessary watchdog of Sandy's activities. Without the
PSC, these customers would have no recourse to protect themselves
from rates charged by Sandy or from other service problems.
Ironically, Petitioners have attempted to distinguish UAMPS by
stating that UAMPS was required by statute to obtain PSC approval,
while in the instant case, the PSC is "excluded" by statutefrom
" exer c ising—jurisdiction
municipalities^"

oveiL_Jthe—sale—of—surplus—water_ b^

Petitioners' Brief at 26.

The facts, however,

rebut these claims. First, Petitioners conditioned their contract
17

upon the PSC's decision not to retain jurisdiction over Sandy's
acquisition of WCWC, a regulated utility. Second, by statute, WCWC
is a PSC regulated utility and cannot discontinue service without
following statutory mandates. Third, and contrary to Petitioners'
statements, the PSC is not "excluded" by statute from exercising
jurisdiction over Sandy. The Salt Lake County court, supra. makes
it clear that there has been no definitive decision by the Utah
Supreme Court on this issue.

570 P.2d at 122.

Petitioners have further claimed that even if the UAMPS
analysis is applicable, the PSC failed to apply the balancing
approach outlined in the case.

Petitioners' Brief at 26-27.

Contrary to these claims, the PSC did balance the interests of
Petitioners with those of the White City Water Users.

The PSC

simply ruled on the necessary pre-condition to the implementation
of the contract between Sandy and WCWC.

A balancing approach is

not necessary for such a strict legal conclusion.
The

case

Commission,

of

CP

638 P.2d

National
519

Corporation

v.

Public

Service

(Utah 1981), further limits Sandy's

authority outside its municipal boundaries. In that case, the Utah
Supreme Court had the opportunity to review Utah Code Ann. §10-814, concerning service beyond city limits, and County Water System
v. Salt Lake County, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954). According to the CP
National court, Section 10-8-14,
. authorizes cities to construct, maintain and
operate electric light works and authorizes them to sell
and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of
such works not required by the city or its inhabitants to
other beyond the limits of the city. We believe that
this language imposes a limitation on a city operating
18

outside its borders. It negates the proposition that a
city could purposely engage in the distribution of power
to localities or persons outside its limits except to
dispose of surplus. County Water System v. Salt Lake
City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P.2d 285 (1954). In the instant
case, the municipalities intend to continue to serve a
large area outside any of their limits. . . .
Section 10-8-14 does not contemplate nor authorize
a city to so operate its electric light and power works,
There is good justification for this limitation since
municipally owned utilities are not subject to the
jurisdiction and supervision of the Public Service
Commission,
but
are
controlled
solely
by
the
administration of the city or town wherein they are
located . . . Customers who are non-residents of the
municipalities would be left at the mercy of officials
over whom they have no control at the ballot box, and
they could not turn to the Public Service Commission for
relief. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 524.
It is for precisely these reasons that the PSC is entitled to and
must retain jurisdiction over any actions of Sandy outside of its
municipal boundaries with respect to the service of the customers
of WCWC.
Petitioners erroneously claim that CP National v. Public
Service Commission. 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981), strengthens their
position that the sale of water by Sandy to non-residents should
not be subject to PSC regulation.
contrary is true.

Petitioners' Brief at 29. The

The CP National court stated that Utah Code

Annotated Section 10-8-14 " . . . imposes a limitation on a city
operating outside its borders. . . . "

Jd. at 524. The court did

not limit this holding to cities providing surplus electrical power
service as Petitioners claimed, but rather expressed a general
concern for non-resident customers who "would be left at the mercy
of officials over whom they have no control at the ballot box, and
19

they could not turn to the [PSC] for relief. . . . "

Id. at 524.

This is a very real problem in the instant case and Sandy has done
nothing to alleviate these concerns.
D.

The PSC Correctly Determined that the Acquisition
of WCWC and the Sale of Water to Non-Sandy
Residents Could Not be Considered "Surplus" Water

The PSC was correct in determining that the water Sandy would
acquire from the purchase of WCWC would not be surplus water.
Contrary to Petitioners7 claims, the PSC took great care in its
analysis of the definition of "surplus" water and stated the
criteria it used for determining if the water sought to be
purchased by Sandy would be "surplus."
28.

Petitioners7 Brief at 27-

The PSC reviewed Utah Code Annotated Section 10-8-14(1),

County Water System v. Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954),
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1977), CP
National Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 638 P.2d 519
(Utah 1981), the underlying facts of the case and the memoranda of
the parties in determining whether WCWC's water would be "surplus"
water of Sandy.
Sandy claims to be purchasing WCWC in order that it may
provide more efficient water service to the WCWC customers, many of
which are outside the municipal boundaries.

The PSC's conclusion

that the water would not be "surplus is therefore a sound one which
is based upon applicable law and fact. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§10-8-14(1),
[The board of commissioners and city council's of cities]
may construct, maintain and operate waterworks, sewer
collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works, electric
light works, telephone lines or public transportation
20

systems, or authorize the construction, maintenance and
operation of the same by others, or purchase or lease
such works or systems from any person or corporation, and
they may sell and deliver the surplus product or service
capacity of any such works, not required bv the city or
its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city,
(emphas is added).
The key phrase is when "not required by the city or its
inhabitants . . ."

Under Sandy's theory, the White City Water

Users would not be guaranteed water service for the long term. The
plain definition of surplus—fl[a]n amount or quantity in excess of
what is needed"2—shows the weakness in Petitioners' argument.
Two Utah Supreme Court cases have addressed the issue of
"surplus water" in situations related, but not identical to the
facts before the Commission in this action.

In County Water

System v. Salt Lake City. 278 P. 2d 285 (Utah 1954), County Water
Systems, a public utility regulated by the PSC, was furnishing
water in an area just south of the Salt Lake City limits.

County

Water System sought a declaratory judgment challenging the right of
Salt Lake City to supply water to the same general area absent PSC
jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court ruled that the PSC did not have

jurisdiction for the reason that the water being sold was surplus
product

as an incident to the present and reasonably to be

anticipated future needs of the City as contemplated by Utah Code
Ann. §10-8-14.

The same is not true in the instant case.

In the Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d 119 (Utah
1977), case, the Supreme Court again embraced the concept that
water furnished by the City incidental to its water serving
2

American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition.
21

activities

for

jurisdiction•

its

residents

would

not

be

subject

to

PSC

However, the Supreme Court left open the question

concerning the extent to which a city may engage in rendering a
utility service outside its city limits absent public regulation.
In light of these cases, it is clear that the exemptions sought by
Sandy and WCWC must be based upon the provision of surplus water as
an incident to Sandy's municipal water service function, or they
must accede to the jurisdiction of the PSC.
The

instant

exemption.

fact

situation

is

far

beyond

that

limited

What Petitioners are attempting to do is to allow for

the transfer of the assets and the termination of regulation by the
PSC of an existing public utility, which has 58% of its connections
located outside the municipal boundaries of Sandy.

The water is

not surplus water to Sandy, nor can it suddenly and magically be
considered

surplus

water

simply

acquisition of the assets of WCWC.

due

to

Sandy's

contractual

Absorbing the obligation to

serve 58% of an existing company the size of WCWC is hardly an act
incidental to the municipal function of the Sandy water department,
especially in view of the fact that Sandv is purposefully acquiring
an existing public utility.
II.

THE PSC TOOK BOTH LEGAL AND FACTUAL EVIDENCE FROM ALL
PARTIES AND MADE ITS DECISION BASED UPON THAT INFORMATION

Petitioners repeatedly claim the PSC made its decision without
taking any evidence in the matter, but the record demonstrates
otherwise.

The PSC received multiple legal memoranda from all of

the parties and at its request was given documentation from
Petitioners

Sandy

and

WCWC

in
22

support

of

their

position.

Petitioners own "Statement of Facts" in their Brief prove that they
presented the PSC with documentation in support of their position.
As the PSC correctly stated in its February 20, 1992, Order,
WCWC's application was filed on November 4, 1991.

On December 9,

1991, a prehearing conference was held where the parties were asked
to brief the issues; the parties briefed the issues and oral
arguments were held on February 18, 1992. Jd. at 2. The PSC made
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support its decision.
Because the PSC did not "rubber stamp" the necessary precondition to their contract (that the PSC not retain jurisdiction),
Petitioners seek to undermine the process (which they initiated)
and the findings and conclusions of the PSC.

Petitioners have

claimed that "there is no evidence in the record to support [the
PSC's] findings, but fail to state what is inaccurate about the
findings.

Petitioners7 Brief at 33.

These findings are based

upon documentation and evidence provided by Petitioners.
Petitioners

have

further

claimed

that

the

process

was

"unfair," but offer no evidence to support that contention.

The

analysis contained in the PSC's February 20, 1992, Order supports
the conclusion that the PSC carefully considered the evidence
before it, as well as the facts and the legal arguments on both
sides.

Petitioners do not like the result, but offer no credible

evidence or rationale to suggest the result should be altered.
It was proper for the PSC to bifurcate the process and to
decide that it had jurisdiction to regulate Sandy. The question of
jurisdiction to regulate a municipality was not factually intensive
23

and the facts underlying this issue were undisputed.

The PSC

appropriately requested and received legal memoranda from all
parties concerning the legal issues of this dispute.
The administrative process, which Petitioners initiated, has
been fair and
mandates.

in keeping with procedural

and

constitutional

The PSC took appropriate evidence, considered legal

memoranda, gave the parties opportunity for oral argument, and made
proper findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which its Order
was based.

On that basis, Petitioners7 complaints are groundless

and unfounded.
III. THE PSC'S ORDER IS FINAL
Petitioners have claimed that the PSC's Order is not final.
Again, this is contrary to the record below and to the case law
defining "final."

Petitioners conditioned their contract on the

PSC's initial decision not to retain jurisdiction and voluntarily
submitted that request to the PSC.

This issue was decided by the

PSC, reconsidered by the PSC and represents a final order presented
to this Court for consideration.
A.

The PSC's Order is Final With Respect to Rule 54(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b):
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
In the absence of such determination and direction, any order
or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate
24

the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order
or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and
the rights and liabilities of the parties.
The first question is whether this rule even applies to the
instant case.

Petitioners approached the PSC with a request that

PSC not retain jurisdiction over Sandy after it purchased WCWC.
This was a condition precedent of the contract of sale between
Sandy

and

WCWC.

The

PSC

decided

to

retain

jurisdiction.

Petitioners asked the PSC to re-consider its decision. The PSC reconsidered its decision and upheld its earlier decision.
None of the Rule 54 cases cited by Petitioners concern appeals
from administrative agencies.
court decisions.

They involve appeals from district

As Salt Lake County convincingly argues in its

February 11, 1993, Brief to this Court, the requirements of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") apply, not Rule 54 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under UAPA, the standard of

review is the "whole record" or "substantial evidence" test. Grace
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Even if it were assumed there is more than one issue to be
resolved at this time (e.g. the question of public interest) and
Rule 54 is applicably, the PSC has made a final, appealable
decision on the issue of jurisdiction to regulate Sandy.

Unless

the terms of the contract between Sandy and WCWC are changed to
allow for PSC jurisdiction, Petitioners only remaining recourse is
before this Court on appeal.

Further proceedings before the PSC

are unnecessary and wasteful.
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The cases cited by Petitioners fail to support their claim
that the PSC's decision was not final.

For instance, Petitioners

cite First Security Bank v. Conlin. 817 P.2d 298 (Utah 1991) for
the proposition that "the Utah Court of Appeals3 held that it did
not have jurisdiction over one claim that had been tried separately
because other related claims remained below." Petitioners Brief at
35.

However, the holding in Conlin. supra. was that since the

trial court's order adjudicated the rights of fewer than all of the
parties, it was not final.

Conlin. therefore, has no application

to the instant case.
The other cases cited by Petitioners in favor of their claim
of lack of finality also fail to support their position.

In Olsen

v. Salt Lake City School District. 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986), for
instance, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a ruling which
left an underlying claim for relief unresolved as to a particular
party was not final as to that party.

Petitioners cite to this

case for the proposition that the terminology used to describe an
order cannot change its fundamental character. Petitioners' Brief
at 36.

The proposition is correct, but works against Petitioners'

position.

A careful review of the fundamental character of the

PSC's order establishes its finality.
Petitioners further claim that the order cannot be final
because the operative facts are "identical to those involved in the
contract issue pending before the Commission. . . . "

3

Petitioners'

This is a Utah Supreme Court case not a Court of Appeals

case.
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Brief at 37.

This statement again ignores the key conditions

within the agreement drafted by Petitioners—absent a PSC decision
to abandon jurisdiction, there is no contract.

Without the

contract, the issue of whether the sale is in the public interest
is moot.

The PSC's Order is therefore final since all relevant

issues have been resolved.
CONCLUSION
The simple question before this Court is whether it was
appropriate for the PSC to retain jurisdiction over the White City
Water Users after Sandy's purchase of WCWC, a PSC regulated
utility.

Petitioners have attempted to confuse this issue by

raising questions as to whether the sale of WCWC to Sandy is in the
public interest and by suggesting those issues must be resolved by
the PSC in this factual situation.

As the PSC appropriately

decided, those issues are irrelevant to the issue of whether the
PSC should retain jurisdiction over WCWC's customers.
By conditioning the contract for Sandy's purchase of WCWC upon
PSC approval, Petitioners created the rules of the game and
suggested the ultimate timing for resolution of the jurisdictional
issue. Because the PSC rejected their request, Petitioners seek to
undermine the PSC's decision to retain jurisdiction to protect the
White City Water Users from excessive rates.

Unfortunately,

Petitioners have failed to offer a viable alternative whereby the
White City Water Users would have an effective method of contesting
rates

charged

by

Sandy.

This

correctness of the PSC's decision.
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action

only

solidifies

the

The White City Water Users do

not reside within incorporated Sandy and, therefore, have no power
at the polls. Absent PSC jurisdiction, those customers would have
no means of protecting themselves from excessive rates charged by
Sandy or from other problems relating to water service.

Such a

result is not contemplated by applicable law and is contrary to
public policy.
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APPEL & MATTSSON

J^frj^/VI. /Appel, / /
Michele Mattsson,
Attorneys for White City Water
Users et al.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

David Stott,
Attorney for
Commission

28

Public

Service

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of February, 1993, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Joint Brief of AppelleeRespondent/Intervenors White City Water Users et al. and the Public
Service Commission was hand-delivered to the following:
Jan Graham, Esq.
Laurie L. Noda, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Val R. Antczak, Esq.
Lee Kapaloski, Esq.
Elizabeth S. Conley, Esq.
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
One Utah Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Craig Anderson, Esq.
Deputy County Attorney
Civil Division
2001 South State Street, #S-3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Calvin L. Rampton, Esq.
James W. Burch, Esq.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

llML.

29

TABLE OF APPENDICES

1.

Constitution of Utah Article VI §28

2.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure §54(b)

3.

Utah Code Annotated §54-4-1

4.

Utah Code Annotated §10-8-14

5.

PSC's Order Severing Proceeding and Report and Order—
Issued February 20, 1992

6.

White City Water Company's Application—
Filed November 4, 1991

7.

Agreement for the Purchase of All of the Stock of White
City Water Company—Signed October 8, 1992

30

Tabl

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE VI §28

Sec 28 [Special privileges forbidden j
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special
commission private corpoiation or association any
power to make supervise or lnterfeic with anv mu
nicipal improvement monev proputv 01 effects
whether held in trust < r otherwise to It vv t lxes n
-.eltct a capitol siu m to perfo? m anv municipal func
tions

i'»72

Tab 2

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
§54(b)

In -Judgment upon m u l t i p l e claims and or in
solving m u l t i p l e parties H l u n n o n t h i n one

churn lor relief is piesented in an action whether as ,\
claim counterclaim
cross-claim
or third partv
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court ma\ direct the entry of a final judgment as to
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ill th< i u t i c -

Tab 3

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§54-4-1

54-4-1. General jurisdiction.
The commission is hereby vested with power and
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public utility in this state, and to
do all things, whether herein specifically designated
or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction;
provided, however, that the Department of Transportation shall have jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of Transportation Act.
1975

Tab 4

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§10-8-14

10-H-14

Welter, s e w e r , ^'a^ e l e c t r i c i t \ , t e l e p h o n e
«IIK1 p u b l i c t r a n s p o r t a t i o n — S e r v i c e
b e y o n d city limits — R e t a i n a g e es
i t ow
i l ) 1 hi v m a v c o n s t r u c t m a i n t a i n a n d opci a l e wa
t e r w o r k s sewer col lection sewer t r e a t m e n t s y s t e m s
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p e r s o n , firm or c o r p o r a t i o n to c o n s t r u c t w a t e r w o r k s
s e w e r collection s e w e r t i c a t m e n t systi ins g a s w o r k s
electric h ^ h t w o r k s t e l e p h o n e l i n e s or public t r a n s
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l e t a i n a ^ e is d i s t r i b u t e d h\ t i n c o n t r a c t o r to s u b i o n
t r a c t o r s on a pro r a t a b a s i s
cuti

Tab 5

—

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH —

In the Matter of the Application
of WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY for
Commission Approval of a Contract
Entered into on the 8th Day of
October, 1991, Under Which Contract
Sandy City and the Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City, Utah,
Will Purchase All of the Outstanding Stock of WHITE CITY WATER
COMPANY.

DOCKET NO. 91-018-02
ORDER SEVERING PROCEEDING
AND
REPORT AND ORDER

ISSUED:

February 20, 1992

SYNOPSIS
Applicant, a certificated water corporation, seeks approval of
the sale of all its stock to a local governmental entity and the
assumption of service to its present customers by a municipal
corporation. Applicant further asks the Commission to declare it has
no jurisdiction over the municipality's subsequent water service
operations insofar as they relate to Applicant's customers residing
outside the municipal boundaries.
We deem the jurisdictional
question of such importance that it should be resolved before
inquiring whether the transfer is in the public interest.
Accordingly, we sever the prayer for declaratory relief from the
balance of the proceeding and declare the Commission has jurisdiction
over a municipality to the extent it provides retail water service
outside its boundaries as a general business.
Appearances:
Calvin L. Rampton
James Burch
Val R. Antczak, Lee Kapoloski
and T. Patrick Casey

For

White City Water Company,
Applicant

ff

Sandy City Corporatiorv,
Intervenor

Jeffrey W. Appel
Michele Mattsson
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et al,
Intervenor

Gerald E. Nielson, Deputy
County Attorney, Salt Lake

Salt Lake County,
Intervenor

Michael Ginsberg
Laurie Noda
Assistant Attorneys General

Division of Public Utilities, Utah Department of
Commerce,
Intervenor
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By the Commission:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The application in this matter was filed November 4, 1991. The
Commission conducted a prehearing conference December 9, 1991, and
asked

the

parties

to

brief

the

issues

of

the

Commission's

jurisdiction to approve the contract which is the subject of these
proceedings and, should the contract be approved, the Commission's
jurisdiction over Sandy City in connection with water customers
residing

outside the city.

Oral arguments were heard by the

Commission on February 18, 1992.

Having been fully advised in the

premises, the Commission enters the following Report and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Applicant
Commission.

is

a

water

corporation

certificated

by

this

In its Application, Applicant seeks approval of a

transfer of all its outstanding stock to an instrumentality of
Sandy City Corporation, (hereafter "Sandy") a Utah municipal
corporation. Applicant further seeks declaratory relief in the
form of a Commission declaration that "the integrated system
constitutes a municipal water system under the laws of the
State of Utah."
2.

Under

the

proposed

contract

terms,

the

stock

would

be

transferred to the Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City
(hereafter

"the Authority").

Applicant would

retain its

corporate existence for the lifetime of the bonds issued by the
Authority to finance the purchase.
3.

Applicant would cease operating the system and, for a nominal
rental, would lease the system to the Authority, which in turn

034^
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would sublease to Sandy.

Sandy would actually operate the

system and, to the extent feasible, would integrate Applicant's
present system with Sandy's municipal system.

Payment to the

bondholders would be made by the Authority out of rentals
realized from the sublease to Sandy, which in turn proposes to
pay the rental fees out of water charges to customers.
4.

In its brief, Sandy states explicitly that customers residing
outside the city limits will be charged more than those
residing within.

The stated rationale is that the customers

outside the city limits should bear a greater proportion of the
costs of the acquisition.
5.

In the contract, the stock transfer is specifically conditioned
upon

this

Commission's

final

Order

declaring

that

the

Commission does not have and will not assert any jurisdiction
over Sandy, whether in regard to customers residing inside or
outside the city limits.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As we view it, Applicant seeks two separate and distinct forms
of relief—approval, per se, of the contract, and declaratory relief
in regard to the Commission's jurisdiction. We deem the declaratory
branch of the proceeding so important that it should be severed from
the approval branch.
The subject transaction differs from other transfers hitherto
considered by the Commission in that the transfer is to an entity
arguably outside Commission jurisdiction. It would leave a number of
customers, who have had recourse to the Commission for grievances,
effectively without recourse to any entity, public or private. Given

no A o
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that stark fact, we refuse to take the "all or nothing" choice
presented

by

Applicant.

Instead,

we

propose

to

resolve

the

jurisdictional issue in this proceeding, with the docket number in
the caption above, as a matter separate from the contract approval.
In light of our action in this proceeding, Applicant may choose to
proceed or not in the approval action.
We turn now to the merits of the jurisdictional issue.
We concede at the outset that we have no authority to regulate
a municipality within its boundaries. However, we conclude that case
law, statutory law, and public policy support our authority to
regulate Sandy's water service outside its boundaries. In reaching
this conclusion, we believe the salient
disenfranchisement

of

the

considerations

extra-territorial

customers,

include
Sandy's

limited statutory powers, the structure of the transaction, our
doubts that service outside the city boundaries would constitute
exercise of a municipal function, and our skepticism that Sandy would
indeed be selling surplus water as contemplated by the Utah statutes.
Disenfranchisement of the Customers
At present, all of Applicant's customers, inside and outside
the city limits, have recourse to the Commission to ensure just and
reasonable rates.

Absent our involvement in Sandy's ratemaking

outside its boundaries, the customers would have no means to prevent
Sandy from charging excessive rates.

In its initial brief, Sandy

states that the customers are not "entirely" disenfranchised, since
they can attend Sandy City public meetings. (Sandy, Initial Brief, at
9).

niA
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We deem the assertion less than ingenuous.

One cannot be

partially disenfranchised; either one can vote or not.

Clearly the

customers located outside Sandy's boundaries do not have a right to
vote in Sandy City.

The opportunity to attend meetings is a poor

substitute for the right to reward or punish via the ballot.
The fact that Sandy proposes to charge a differential rate
immediately upon approval of the transaction is a strong indication
of how the

"outside" customers would

fare under the proposal.

Indeed, we can predict with considerable confidence, that in case of
conflict between the interests of franchised and disenfranchised
customers, the interests of the former will receive priority—no
matter how vociferous the protests raised in meetings.
Limitation of Sandy's Statutory Powers
Unquestionably, as Sandy asserts, the Commission is a creature
of statute with all the limitations on power and jurisdiction that
implies. However, Sandy itself stands in much the same position; its
powers are circumscribed also. See State v. Hutchinson, 624 P. 2d
1116, 1121 (Utah 1980).1
We proceed first on the premise that if Sandy takes over the
utility service of White City Water Company, the city must also take
on the utility's obligations.

According to our Supreme Court in

North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co, 223 P.2d 577

^he Hutchinson Court actually broadened a municipality's
authority by holding that the powers delegated by the Legislature
should be liberally construed. The Court's rationale was that local
democratic institutions should be strengthened, thus empowering
citizens in regard to the local affairs most immediately affecting
them.
Were we to adopt the Applicant's position, we would, of
course, actually disempower the extra-territorial customers, running
counter to the Hutchinson rationale.
n9/IC
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(Utah 1950) , when North Salt Lake condemned a water company, it took
upon itself the obligations imposed upon the water company, including
the

effect

of

an Order

issued

by this

Commission

before the

condemnation.2
Other jurisdictions have extended the principle explicitly to
include rate regulation. For example, in City of Orangeburg v. Moss,
204 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 1974), the court held that the South Carolina
PSC had jurisdiction to regulate a municipality operating electrical
facilities

outside

its

boundaries.

The

court

held

that

the

constitutional grant of Power to municipalities by the State to
operate electrical facilities was not a limitation on the power of
the State to regulate those activities through the PSC or otherwise.
It is the position of the plaintiff in the current action
that this constitutional grant of power to the
municipalities of the State to operate electrical
facilities is a limitation on the power of the State of
South Carolina to regulate those activities through the
Public Service Commission or otherwise. The writer does
not agree. He feels that the section in guestion was no
more than a constitutional provision to permit certain
municipal activities previously held ultra vires and that

2

At the time of that hearing the water company was a
utility subject to the rules and regulations of the
Public Service Commission and its findings and orders
were binding on the company, its successors, those
claiming through or under it, and those later dealing
with it.
•

*

*

If limitations were imposed on the water company in the
hearing before the Public Service Commission, then
condemnation of the property by the town would not unblock
the controls. The . . . town takes the franchise and
property subject to all burdens of furnishing water that
were imposed at the time of transfer.
Id. at 223 P.2d 577. If a previous Commission Order is binding on a
town clearly exercising a municipal function, a fortiori the town is
subject to Commission regulation when exercising a non-municipal
function.

n«3
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it is not to be construed as limiting the powers of the
State to regulate such activities, (emphasis added.)
Id. at 378. It is true that South Carolina had in place legislation
specifically

empowering their PSC to regulate extra-territorial

service. The issue, nevertheless, was the constitutionality of that
legislation, and we believe there is scant difference in principle
between that case and this.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that one of the obligations
Sandy may be required to assume is that of state regulation of rates
charged to customers residing outside the city limits.
As derogating from the foregoing analysis, we have been cited
Article XI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution which provides a
municipality the authority to furnish public utility services "local
in extent and use"; Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-914 (3) ; the Municipal
Building Authority Act; the 1988 amended definition of "person" under
Utah Code Ann. § 4-2-2; and Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 which gives a
municipality

authority to condemn a water system.

We do not

perceive any of these provisions as denying us authority to regulate
rates charged by Sandy for water service outside its boundaries.
Article XI, Section 5, gives Sandy the power to furnish public
utility

services, but not necessarily the power to set extra-

territorial rates, particularly in light of the "local in extent and
use" provision, which has no obvious meaning

other than as a

reference to the City's boundaries.
Any prohibition by the Municipal Building Authority Act is
irrelevant in this proceeding.
above,

the

sole

As noted in the Findings of Fact

role of the Authority

is to be a conduit.

Obviously, Sandy could issue and service its own bonds. We strongly
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suspect the Authority is involved in the transaction only in a "belt
and suspenders11 attempt to insulate the real principals, Applicant
and Sandy, from our jurisdiction.

We believe we are entitled to

assess the substance, not the mere form, of the transaction.

So

assessing the transaction, it is obvious the Authority has no real
role or participation in the arrangement, and its presence should be
disregarded.
It is true that in 1988 the Legislature deleted "governmental
entity" from the definition of "person."
(1988).

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2

Our perusal of the Legislative history of this change,

however, does not indicate that the Legislature intended to foreclose
our regulation of a cityfs extra-territorial retail water customers.
(See transcript of the Legislative history on this amendment,
Exhibit

,f

A" to Reply Brief, White City Water Users).

Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 does give a municipality power
to condemn a water system, but it does not necessarily give a
municipality power to set utility rates for extra-territorial retail
customers. In a condemnation proceeding, a city is limited by strict
laws to protect the new owners of those systems and the citizens
served thereby. Indeed, as noted earlier, the St. Joseph Water case,
supra, suggests that water systems acquired by condemnation carry
with them all their regulatory baggage.
Sandy does not have specific delegated authority to serve water
outside its boundaries without state regulation.

Where there are

gaps in the coverage of applicable statutes, as in the instant case,
we believe that legislative intent should be interpreted so as to

no

A
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protect constitutional rights of citizens, which in this case are the
extra-territorial retail customers.
The Nature of the Arrangement
As noted above, Sandy has made great efforts to avoid our
jurisdiction in the way it has set up the proposed transfer.

The

elaborate

the

nature

of

the

arrangement

between

White

City,

Authority, and Sandy, renders the arrangement suspect.
Sandy's initial brief claims that neither White City, the
Authority, nor Sandy are subject to our regulation.
Brief, at 6-14).

(Sandy, Initial

As noted above, the role of the Authority is

explicable only as an attempt to avoid our jurisdiction.

Given the

expressed intent to charge extra-territorial customers differential
rates, Sandy's good faith, in structuring the transaction as it has,
must be questioned.
Sandv is Not Performing a Municipal Function
Should Sandy provide water service to White City's extraterritorial customers, it would, to that extent, not be exercising a
municipal function.

Sandy would be acting as a traditional utility

(exercising a business function) and therefore would be subject to
regulation.
Sandy claims that Utah Constitution Art. VI, Section 28,
prohibits us from interfering with Sandy's municipal functions.
(Sandy, Initial Brief, at 7).

Obviously, we agree that we cannot

interfere with Sandy's municipal functions, but we maintain that
Sandy's proposed service to the extra-territorial customers is not a
municipal function.

r\ o .1 Ci
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Recent Utah cases support our position.

In Utah Associated

Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, 789 P.2d 298
(Utah 1990), in which Art. VI, Section 28, was at issue, the Court
discussed

the

Associated

alleged

Municipal

"municipal

Power

Systems

function"
("UAMPS")

performed
in

by

attempting

construct a utility line and to provide utility service.
resisted

the

jurisdiction

of the

Commission

on

Utah
to

UAMPS

constitutional

grounds, arguing that they were political subdivisions exercising
municipal functions, even though part of their service area was
located outside, or would have a substantial impact outside, the
boundaries of the political subdivisions.
The UAMPS Court applied a balancing test first enunciated in
City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board. 767 P.2d, 530
(Utah 1988).

Under that test, no particular activity conducted by a

municipality is ipso facto a municipal function for purposes of Art.
VI, Section 28.

Instead, a functional analysis is to be conducted,

considering such factors as
the relative abilities of the state and municipal
governments to perform the function, the degree to which
the performance of the function affects the interests of
those beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and the
extent to which the legislation under attack will intrude
upon the ability of the people within the municipality to
control through their elected officials the substantive
policies that affect them uniquely.3

3

Id. at 534. The Court went on to say the balancing test would
best serve the Constitutional purpose without "erecting mechanical
conceptual categories that, without serving any substantial interest,
may hobble the effective government which the state constitution as
a whole was designed to permit." Ibid. In the instant case, of
course, the only "substantial interest" our assuming jurisdiction
would affect would be that of Sandy in "milking" the extraterritorial customers to the maximum extent possible.
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Applying that test, the UAMPS Court had little difficulty in finding
that the construction of the utility transmission line for the
purpose of generating, buying and selling electricity across the
state was outside the ambit of Art. VI, Section 28. Utah Associated
Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, supra, 789 P.
2d at 302.
The present proposal is closely analogous to the UAMPS case.
In particular, those residing outside Sandy stand to be severely
impacted, while our assuming jurisdiction in regard to them would
have minimal impact on Sandy's legitimate interests. By purposefully
acquiring an existing public utility, and thereby taking over the
obligation to serve 58% of the customers of an existing certificated
public utility, Sandy is stepping outside the exercise of its
municipal function and subjecting itself to state regulation of rates
for those extra-territorial customers surplus.
Sandy attempts to bolster its position by referring to Utah
Code Ann.

§ 10-8-14(1) concerning sale of surplus water by a

municipality.

A careful reading of this statute, however, weighs

against Sandy's proposal and in favor of the extra-territorial
customers.
According to the statute, a city "may sell and deliver the
surplus product or service capacity of any such works, not required
by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the
city. . . . "

In attempting to show that it would be serving

"surplus" water in accordance with this statute, Sandy states that it
"has more than ample capacity to serve the non-Sandy White City
customers and will therefore in fact be selling 'surplus' water to
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them upon acquisition of the White City system."
Brief, at 8) .

(Sandy, Initial

This interpretation is contrary to Utah case law on

the subject and contrary to a common sense definition of "surplus."
In support of Sandy's interpretation of surplus, it cites
County Water System v. Salt Lake Citv, 278 P 2d 285 (Utah 1954) and
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P 2d 119 (Utah 1977)
In County Water System, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated
that the authority of municipalities to sell utility services beyond
its corporate boundaries was limited to the disposal of surplus
water.

Id. at 289.
In fact, after first delineating a municipality's powers of

surplus water disposal in sweeping terms, Justice Crockett, writing
for the Court, appears to have had immediate second thoughts. In his
next paragraph, he hedged the municipality's authority:
But such permissive sale of surplus water . . . is clearly
not calculated to permit the city to purchase water solely
for resale, nor to construct, own or manage facilities and
equipment for the distribution of water outside of its
city limits as a general business.
Id. at 290.
The Court also made clear its concept of surplus water—a
temporary glut occasioned by provision for prudent future expansion.
This would,

according to the court, foreclose a municipality's

commitment to purchasers of surplus water for any long-term supply.
Ibid.

Under this concept, if Sandy is indeed to sell surplus water,

the extra-territorial customers stand to be left literally high and
dry in the near to medium term.
In this case, however, Sandy will not be disposing of surplus
water it now possesses—it will be surplus only by virtue of Sandy's

n
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calculated

acquisition

customers—precisely

of

the

a

class

of captive,

situation

Justice

disenfranchised

Crockett

inveighed

against.
Sandy cites Salt Lake County, supra, for the proposition that
"[A municipality's] business in furnishing water to its residents and
activities

reasonably

incidental

thereto

regulation by the Public Service Commission."
122.

is

not

subject

to

Id. at 570 P.2d 121-

Sandy, however, fails to quote the complete paragraph. The

next, and more relevant sentence is: "But just however great an
extent a city may engage in rendering a utility service outside its
city limits without being subject to some public regulation is not so
clearly determined." (emphasis added.)
mere dictum.

The second sentence is not

The case involved the propriety of a summary judgment

rendered by the district court, and the Supreme Court remanded for
determination of precisely the issue of a municipality's amenability
to regulation of extra-territorial service.

We do not know the

subsequent course of the litigation.
The Salt Lake County case evidences to us the Court's concern
with precisely the potential for abuse presented by the instant
proposal. We think it would be difficult to find a clearer instance
of a city's stepping over the boundary of legitimate surplus water
sales under the statute.
Our conclusion is strengthened by C.P. National Corporation v.
Public Service Commission, 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981),

According to

the Court,
" . . . We believe that [Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14] imposes
a limitation on a city operating outside its borders. It
negates the proposition that a city could purposely engage
in the distribution of power to localities or persons

0353
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outside its limits except to dispose of surplus." [Citing
County Water System, supra].
In the instant case, the
municipalities intend to continue to serve a large area
outside any of their limits. . . .
Section 10-8-14 does not contemplate nor authorize a city
to so operate its electric light and power works. There
is
good
justification
for this
limitation
since
municipally owned utilities are not subject to the
jurisdiction and supervision of the Public Service
Commission
but
are
controlled
solely
by
the
administration of the city or town wherein they are
located . . . customers who are non-residents of the
municipalities would be left at the mercy of officials
over whom they have no control at the ballot box and they
could not turn to the Public Service
Commission for
relief. (emphasis added.) (citations omitted.)
Id. at 524.
We can only add that the situation is not one whit different
when a municipality purposefully acquires an existing, regulated
water system.

While there may be no explicit statutory authority for

us to assume jurisdiction, the obvious remedy for the abuse of extraterritorial customers is for us to continue to regulate their rates;
otherwise, to meet the Court's concern, the instant proposal would
have to be found ultra vires.4
If there is a common thread running through the history of
economic regulation in the United States, it is the abhorrence of
unchecked monopoly.

We see no reason to suppose that a monopoly held

by a municipality over powerless extra-territorial utility customers
would be any more benevolent than a monopoly held privately.

Sandy's

expressed intent to impose higher rates immediately upon the extra4

That is the course the Court took in the CP National case. The
main issue was the constitutionality of the municipalities1 acquiring
an existing electrical utility by condemnation. The Court assumed
without discussion that we would have no jurisdiction over rates
charged the extra-territorial customers. One wonders if the same
result would have been reached had the Court considered the
jurisdictional issue and applied the City of West Jordan test.
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territorial customers is ample demonstration of the reason we are
unwilling to cede jurisdiction in these circumstances.
We conclude that in the event the proposal presented by
Applicant were to be approved by the Commission, the Commission would
retain jurisdiction to regulate rates charged the extra-territorial
retail customers, at least to the extent of nullifying invidious
discrimination.

Accordingly, Applicant's prayer for a declaratory

judgment to the contrary should be denied.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
»

On the Commission's own motion, the prayer of WHITE CITY WATER
COMPANY, for a declaration that, should the Commission approve
a transfer of the stock of said company to the Sandy City
Building Board, pursuant to the contract delineated in said
Company's

application,

the

Commission

would

have

no

jurisdiction thereafter to set rates for customers residing
outside the boundaries of Sandy City, be, and the same hereby
is, severed from the balance of the proceeding and given the
Docket Number 91-018-02;
»

Said prayer is denied;

»

Any party aggrieved by this Order may, within 3 0 days of the
issuance hereof, petition for review; failure so to do will
forfeit the right to such review, as well as the right to
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.

0355
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DATED a t S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah, t h i s 2 0 t h day o f F e b r u a r y ,
1992.

BrianTT

2ZSZZ

i t e y k r t , (Chairman

„-M/£*yl~^

StepheA C. Hewlett, Commissioner
Pro Tempore
ATTEST:

^L

Jultiie Orchard
Commission S e c r e t a r y

Tab 6
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY FOR
COMMISSION APPROVAL OF A CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO ON THE 8TH DAY OF
OCTOBER, 1991, UNDER WHICH
CONTRACT SANDY CITY AND THE
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY OF
SANDY CITY, UTAH, WILL PURCHASE
ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING STOCK OF
WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY

APPLICATION

Docket No

_ °JI-oi%o\

White City Water Company hereby petitions and
represents to the Commission as follows:
1.

White City V7at^r Company is a corporation

organized under and pursuant to the laws of the State of
Utah and having its principal place of business in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah,
2.

Sandy City is a municipal corporation organized

and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State
of Utah and is located within the boundaries of Salt Lake
County, Utah.
3.

The Municipal Building Authority of Sandy

City, Utah, is established and created pursuant to Title 17A,
Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
4.

On the 8th day of October, 1991, Sandy City

and the Muncipal Building Authority of Sandy City entered

-()079

into a contract with White City Water Company whereby Sandy
City, through its municipal building authority, will acquire
the stock of White City Water Company, pursuant to certain
terms and conditions set forth in the contract, a copy of
which contract is marked Exhibit A and attached hereto.
5.

White City Water Company holds Certificate

of Convenience and Necessity No. 1121 issued by the Public
Service Commission of Utah on the 11th day of May, 1955,
authorizing the Company to:

(a)

Construct, maintain and operate a water system
consisting of a water well located in Section 8,
Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian
in Salt Lake County, Utah having a capacity of
approximately 1,200 gallons of water per minute
with a pipe line leading from said well to a 500,000
gallon reservoir located in Section 9, Township 3
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian
with a pipe line leading from said storage tank
to the area to be served with the necessary distribution
lines, service lines and other facilities to serve
water for domestic, culinary and other purposes
within the area bounded on the West by the East
line of 7th East Street, on the East by 20th East
Street, on the North by 94th South Street and
on the South by 120th South Street in Salt Lake
County, Utah.

(b)

To construct, maintain and operate such additional
wells, pipe lines and extended water system facilities
as may be necessary from time to time to adequately
serve water for domestic, culinary and other purposes
within the area above specified.
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6.

The above described geographical area is

contiguous and lies partly within Sandy City and partly
within the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County.

White

City Water Company has approximately 3650 customers plus
83 lines to residential lots, not yet connected.

42% of

the connections are within the city limits of Sandy City
and 58% are in contiguous Salt Lake County.
7.

Sandy City has constructed and maintained

a municipal culinary water system rendering service to approximately 21,050 residential, commercial, and industrial customers
within the limits of Sandy City.

The Sandy City water system

is an efficient and well-maintained system having facilities
to deliver water to its customers.

The water system at present

has facilities which are fully sufficient to provide storage
and pressure to its existing customers as well as to the customers
of White City Water Company if this contract is approved.
8.

White City Water Company has a distributing

system sufficient to serve its current customers.

White

City Water Company also has water rights which during
ordinary years are fully sufficient to give adequate and
continuous water service to its customers.

However, White

City Water Company lacks adequate facilities for the
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storage of water at a sufficient elevation to provide sufficient
pressure to adequately serve its customers and/ in case
of an emergency draw down, a lack of sufficient storage
capacity to meet a prolonged emergency.

In order to adjust

for this situation, White City Water Company has arrangements
whereby it will sell certain water at its wellheads to the
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and purchase
back at a very much higher price from the Salt Lake County
Water Conservancy District water delivered at a sufficient
elevation and in sufficient quantities to provide both pressure
and adequate flow in emergency situations. This arrangement
is an expensive one for White City Water Company as it receives
for its water at the wellhead under this contract $20.00
per acre foot while it pays for the water delivered at the
higher elevations the sum of $125.22 per acre foot. This
contract with the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District
is subject to cancellation by the parties. Furthermore,
the price to be charged for the water that is delivered
is almost exclusively at the discretion of the Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District.

Thus White City Water

Company is under constant threat of either discontinuance
of this service or the pricing of the service at a level
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which is unacceptable to White City Water Company and its
customers who would bear the ultimate responsibility of
paying for these services through higher rates,
9.

White City Water Company has attempted to

get permission to construct additional storage facilities
on property which it owns in Sandy City and which is of
sufficient elevation to provide adequate pressure.

Sandy

City, however, has been unwilling to grant a variance from
zoning ordinances to permit the construction of such storage
facilities and this Commission has declined to use its authority/
if such authority it has, to compel Sandy City to grant
such variance.

White City Water Company has explored other

sites outside Sandy City as a possible location for constructing
new storage facilities; however, all such available sites
are expensive to purchase, remote from the White City Water
Company's distribution system and its wells and would entail
the expenditure of money beyond the present resources of
White City Water Company.

If it were possible to borrow

funds for such construction, it would require substantially
higher rates from the customers of White City Water Company
in order to service the debt and amortize the investment
of such additional storage facilities.

-5-
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10.

Sandy City already has in existence or under

construction sufficient storage facilities to provide adequate
volume and pressure for White City Water Ccmpany customers
if operation of the two systems were integrated.
11.

While White City Water Company customers

now pay generally lower rates than Sandy City charges to
its customers for similar service, this situation will not
prevail for long if White City must continue to render the
service to its customers on its own.

The cost of maintaining

an aging system and the cost of required new facilities
as above described will in the near future require White
City Water Company to raise its rates substantially for
it to continue as a viable corporation.
12.

The water systems cf White City Water Company

and Sandy City are well matched for integration.

The approval

of this application is in the public interest and will result
in better service to all customers of White City Water Company
and Sandy City in the foreseeable future.
13.

As part of the terms of the agreement, the

White City Water Company wll remain intact as a corporation
over the life of the bonds which the municipal building
authority of Sandy City proposes to issue to raise capital
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for the acquisition of the stock of White City Water Company.
Sandy City, however, will operate the two systems on an
integrated basis and requests an order from this Commission
to the effect that such an integrated system will be considered
a municipal system in its entirety under the laws of the
State of Utah and thus be exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 174A-13-914(3) from the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission of Utah.
WHEREFORE, applicant prays that this matter be
set down for hearing and that upon such hearing the Commission
approve the contract described above and find that the integrated
system constitutes a municipal water system under the laws
of the State of Utah.
DATED this

31st

day of,

Calvin L. Rampton
Attorney for White City "Water Company
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH,
) SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE.

)

John E. Papanikolas, being first duly sworn,
deposes and says that I am the President of White City Water
Company, that I have read the foregoing Application and
that the same is true and complete to the best of my knowledge
and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -*&/
of October, 1991.

day

Notary Public ^STf.
^i^A^/>^_^_
Residing at £&L^
Jttj&LS&ttre&S
<f^

TT

My Commission Expires:
:y
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Tab 7

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
AGREEMENT FOR
THE PURCHASE OP ALL OP THE STOCK
OF WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY
This Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into this
8th day of October, 1991, by Sandy City, Utah (the "City"), the
Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City, Utah (the "Authority") and all of the shareholders (the "Shareholders") of White
City Water Company, Inc., a Utah corporation (the "Company"), for
the purchase of all of the outstanding shares in the Company by
the Authority, as more fully described herein.
RECITALS
A.
The City has created the Authority pursuant
Title 17A, Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
amended (the "Act").

to
as

B.
The Authority is authorized by the provisions of
the Act to purchase shares of the outstanding stock of the Company and to enter into this Agreement and the other agreements
pertaining to this transaction which are to be executed and
delivered by the Authority.
C.
The Authority desires to purchase 100% of the outstanding stock of the Company, subject to the terms and conditions stated herein.
D.
The Shareholders are the owners of 100% of the
outstanding stock of the Company and each of the Shareholders
desires to sell his or her shares of the stock of the Company on
the terms and conditions stated herein; however, as a condition
to the sale, the Shareholders desire that the Authority or the
City be not permitted to merge, consolidate or liquidate the Company in order to maintain the corporate identity and integrity of
the Company in case of a default under this Agreement requiring
the Shareholders to repossess the Shares.
E.
The Authority is authorized by the Act to issue
revenue bonds thereunder to finance the acquisition of all or
part of the stock of the Company.
F.
Pursuant to the Act, the Authority is authorized
to purchase the shares of the Company and cause the assets of the
Company to be leased, and the beneficial ownership rights in the
Company to be assigned, to the City for annual rentals which are
sufficient to pay the annual debt service payments to be paid by
the Authority on bonds issued by it to finance the cost of
acquiring all or part of the shares of the Company; provided,
however, that the City's obligations to make annual rental and
royalty payments each year are subject to annual budget and
appropriation for such purpose by the City Council and shall be
terminated in the event of nonappropriation.

G.
Pursuant to the Act, the City desires to lease
from the Authority the water system (the "System") now owned by
the Company, and to receive an assignment of the beneficial ownership rights in the Company, following the acquisition by the
Authority of the Company stock from the Shareholders.
H.
Bonds issued by the Authority may be secured by a
pledge of the rentals/royalties payable to the Authority by the
City from the lease of the System, and assignment of beneficial
ownership rights in the Company, by a mortgage on and security
interest in the System, a pledge of the stock of Company and by
other security devices.
I.
The Shareholders are willing to accept revenue
bonds issued by the Authority, secured as provided herein, in
partial payment for their shares of the Company's stock, in order
to receive tax exempt interest payable on the bonds and to have
the sale of shares treated as an installment sale under federal
income tax laws.
Now, therefore, in consideration of the mutual agreements, covenants and undertakings of the parties set forth
herein, the parties hereto agree as follows:
ARTICLE I.

DEFINITIONS

The terms defined in this Article I shall have the
meanings provided herein, unless the context clearly requires
otherwise. Except where the context clearly requires otherwise,
words of the masculine gender shall be construed to include correlative words of the feminine and neuter genders and vice versa
and words of the singular number shall be construed to include
correlative words of the plural number and vice versa. The terms
"hereby," "hereof," "hereto," "herein," "hereunder," and any similar terms as used in this Agreement, refer to this Agreement.
All references herein to sections, subsections, paragraphs or
clauses are, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, to
the corresponding sections, subsections, paragraphs or clauses of
this Agreement.
"Act" means the Utah Municipal Building Authority Act,
Title 17A, Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
"Aggregate Downpayment" means the aggregate amount to
be paid by the Authority on the Aggregate Purchase Price at Closing, as provided in Section 2.5(a)(1).
"Aggregate Purchase Price" means the aggregate purchase
price for the Shares stated in Section 2.2, as it may be adjusted
as provided in Section 2.4.
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"Agreement" means this Agreement, including the Exhibits hereto.
"Annual Payment Date" means
next succeeding the first anniversary
ter on each anniversary of such first
interest thereon shall have been paid

the first day of the month
of the Closing and thereafday until the Bonds and all
in full.

"Audited Financial Statements" means the audited financial statements of the Company dated as of December 31, 1990, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit Af and the Closing
Date Audited Financial Statements.
"Authority" means the Municipal Building Authority of
Sandy City, Utah.
"Bond Counsel" means Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake
City, Utah, as bond counsel for the Bonds.
"Bondholder" or "Bondholders" means the holders of the
Bonds outstanding.
"Bondholder's Percentage Share" means, for each Bondholder, the principal amount of the Bonds held by the Bondholder,
divided by the aggregate principal amount of the Bonds, multiplied by one hundred.
"Bonds" means the revenue bonds of the Authority, dated
on the date of Closing, to be issued pursuant to the Act to
finance part of the Aggregate Purchase Price and delivered at
Closing to the Shareholders who elect not to be paid in full for
their Individual Shares at Closing.
"City" means Sandy City, Utah.
"City Council" means the City Council of the City.
"Closing" means the date on which the transaction contemplated by this Agreement and the Related Documents will be
closed, as specified in Section 2.6.
"Closing Date Audited Financial Statements" means the
audited financial statements of the Company, which have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
and practices consistently applied, current as of the date of
Closing, to be delivered to the Authority as provided in Section
5.1(a) hereof.
"Company" means White City Water Company, Inc., a Utah
corporat ion.
"Deed of Trust and Security Agreement" means the Deed
of Trust, Assignment of Rents and Security Agreement dated as of
the date of Closing, as may be extended by agreement of the
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parties hereto in writing, between the Authority and the Trustee
granting a first lien and security interest on and in the System
and the Revenues and other collateral securing the Bonds.
"Employees" means the employees of the Company
on Exhibit B hereto.

listed

"Franchise Order" means the Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity No. 1121 of the PSC dated May 11, 1955, in the Matter of the Amended Application of White City Water Company, Inc.
for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, Case No. 4140,
granting to the Company the rights in the Service Area as stated
therein.
"Governmental Authority" means the United States of
America, any state or political subdivision thereof and any
entity exercising executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory or
administrative functions of or pertaining to government.
"Indenture" means the Indenture of Trust dated as of
the date of Closing, as may be extended by the parties hereto in
writing, between the Authority and the Trustee, pursuant to which
the Bonds will be issued.
"Individual Shares" means the number of shares of the
common stock of the Company owned by each of the Shareholders as
shown on Exhibit C attached hereto.
"Individual Shares Downpayment" means the amount of the
Individual Shares Purchase Price which is to be paid to each of
the Shareholders by the Authority at Closing.
"Individual Shares Purchase Price" means the portion of
the Aggregate Purchase Price to be paid to each of the Shareholders for the Purchase of his or her Individual Shares, as provided
in Section 2.3.
"Lease and Assignment" means the Lease and Assignment
Agreement dated as of the date of Closing, as may be extended by
the parties hereto
in writing, between the Authority, as
lessor/assignor, and the City, as lessee/assignee, pursuant to
which the City will lease the System from the Authority, and by
which the Authority will assign the beneficial ownership rights
in the Company to the City.
"Lease Payments" means the annual payments to be made
by the City to the Authority under the Lease and Assignment.
"Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation,
business trust, joint stock company, trust, unincorporated association, joint venture, Governmental Authority or other entity of
whatever nature.
"PSC" means the Public Service Commission of Utah.
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"PSC Order" means the order of the PSC referred to in
Sect ion 7.1.
"Related Documents" means the Indenture, the Lease and
Assignment, the Financing Statement, the Stock Pledge Agreement,
the Deed of Trust and Security Agreement and such other documents
as may be defined as Related Documents in the Indenture.
"Revenues" means all moneys pledged under the Indenture
and paid or payable to the Trustee for the account of the Authority in accordance with the Lease and Assignment, including, without limitation, the Lease Payments.
"Security" means: (a) a first pledge of and security
interest in the Revenues, (b) a first lien on and security interest in the System, and (c) a first pledge of and lien on the
Shares.
"Semiannual Interest Payment Date" means the first day
of the next succeeding six months from the Closing and thereafter
on each anniversary of this date.
"Service Area" means the area located in Salt Lake
County, Utah, whose boundaries are: north boundary - the south
side of 9400 South Street; east boundary - the west side of 2000
East Street; south boundary - the north side of 12000 South
Street; west boundary - the east side of 700 East Street, in
which the Company is currently authorized to provide water utility service pursuant to the Franchise Order. The Company is currently offering or providing service in the area shown on the map
attached hereto as Exhibit D.
"Shareholders" means all of the owners of the capital
stock of the Company.
"Shareholders' Agent" means John E. Papanikolas, as
agent for the Shareholders for the purpose of giving certain
notifications to the Authority, as provided herein.
"Shareholder's Proportionate Share" means any increase
or decrease in the Aggregate Purchase Price pursuant to Section
2.4, divided by the number of Shares and multiplied by the number
of each Shareholder's Individual Shares.
"Shares" means one hundred Percent (100%) of the Individual Shares, being one hundred percent (100%) of the outstanding capital stock of the Company.
"State" means the State of Utah.
"Stated Interest Rate for the Bonds" means seven and
four-tenths percent (7.4%) per annum, calculated on the basis of
a 360-day year of twelve 30-day months, the interest rate payable
on the Bonds.
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"Stock Pledge Agreement" means the Stock Pledge Agreement dated as of the date of Closing, as may be extended by the
parties hereto, in writing, between the Authority, the Shareholders and the Trustee granting a first lien and security interest
on and in the Shares of the Company.
"System" means the culinary water system of the Company, including all water rights and facilities pertaining
thereto, as more particularly described on Exhibit E attached
hereto.
"Trustee" means West One Trust Company, a Utah corporation, as trustee under the Indenture.
ARTICLE II.

SALE AND PURCHASE OF THE SHARES

Section 2.1
Purchase and Sale. The Authority agrees
to buy from each of the Shareholders and each of the Shareholders
agrees to sell to the Authority, his or her Individual Shares.
Section 2.2
Aggregate Purchase Price.
The Authority
will pay the aggregate amount of Five Million Seven Hundred Thousand Dollars ($5,700,000.00) for the Shares, subject to adjustment as providea in Section 2.4 hereof, together with interest on
the Bonds, as provided in Section 2.5.
Section 2.3 Individual Shares Purchase Price. Each of
the Shareholders shall be paid for his or her Individual Shares a
principal amount equal to the Aggregate Purchase Price multiplied
by the number of each Shareholder's Individual Shares and divided
by the number of Shares, together with applicable interest, as
provided in Section 2.5.
Section 2.4
Adiustment to Aggregate Purchase Price.
The principal amount of the Aggregate Purchase Price will be
adjusted upward or downward in an amount equal to any change in
the retained earnings of the Company from the amount thereof
stated OP the Audited Financial Statements and in the amount
thereof stated in the Closing Date Audited Financial Statements.
Furthermore, the retained earnings number from the Closing Date
Audited Financial Statements, used for the calculation described
in this paragraph, shall be adjusted by adding back the amount of
depreciation expenses accrued by the Company through June 30,
1991, which shall not be reduced by the negative amortization of
connection fees and "aid to construction assets" {as defined in
the Audited Financial Statements). Any adjustments to the principal amount of the Aggregate Purchase Price under this Section
2.4 will be determined within thirty (30) days subsequent to the
receipt of the Closing Date Audited Financial Statements.
The
Authority and the Trustee shall be directed in the Indenture to
take the actions described below upon the determination of this
Section 2.4 adjustment:
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Calculate for each of the Shareholders the amount
of his or her Shareholder's Proportionate Share
applicable to this Section 2.4 adjustment. If the
adjustment results in an increase in the Aggregate
Purchase Price, the Authority shall pay to the
Trustee for each of the Shareholders an amount, in
cash, equal to his or her Shareholder's Proportionate Share applicable to this Section 2.4
adjustment.
If the adjustment
results
in a
decrease in the Aggregate Purchase Price each of
the Shareholders shall pay to the Authority, in
cash, the amount of his or her Shareholder's Proportionate Share applicable to this Section 2.4
adjustment.
Section 2.5

Payment of the Aggregate Purchase Price.

(a)
The Aggregate Purchase Price and applicable
interest thereon shall be paid as follows:
(1) The Aggregate Downpayment shall be paid
in cash, at Closing, in the amount specified to
the Authority, in writing, by the Shareholders'
Agent, not less than fifteen (15) days before the
Closing, which amount shall not exceed One Million
Dollars ($1,000,000.00), which amount is presently
estimated to be $884,100.
The Individual Shares
Downpayment for each of the Shareholders shall be
paid by the Authority to each of the Shareholders
at Closing.
(2) The balance of the Aggregate Purchase
Price shall be evidenced by the Bonds, to be
issued and delivered by the Authority to the
Shareholders at Closing pursuant to the Act. The
principal of the Bonds shall be payable on each
Annual Payment Date, in fifteen (15) annual principal installments which, together with the interest payable thereon as provided below in this Section 2.5, will produce annual debt service payments which are as nearly equal as practicable
(except for the last principal installment).
(3) Interest on the Bonds will commence to
accrue on the date of Closing and shall be paid on
each Semiannual Interest Payment Date and on each
Annual Payment Date, until the Aggregate Purchase
Price shall have been paid in full.
(b) Interest on the Bonds shall be payable at the
Stated Interest Rate for the Bonds.
shall

(c)
be

The last principal installment of the Bonds
in an amount sufficient to pay in full all
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outstanding principal, late payment charges, if any,
and any other amounts owed under this Agreement or the
Related Documents with respect to the purchase of the
Shares.
(d) Overdue principal and (to the extent permitted by applicable law) interest on the Bonds shall bear
interest from the due date at a per annum interest rate
equal to the Stated Interest Rate for the Bonds plus
four percent (4%), until such overdue amount shall be
paid in full; provided, however, that no representation
is or shall be made regarding the tax exemption of
interest to the extent of the above mentioned increase
of four percent (4%) over the Stated Interest Rate for
the Bonds for late payment.
(e) It is anticipated that some of the Shareholders will receive from the Aggregate Downpayment at
Closing, in cash, the entire principal amount of their
Individual Shares Purchase Price, and that each of the
other Shareholders will receive an amount at Closing
equal to approximately ten percent (10%) of their Individual Shares Purchase Price. The Shareholders' Agent
will provide to the Authority, not less than fifteen
(15) days before Closing, the names of the Shareholders
whose Individual Shares Purchase Price is to be paid in
full at Closing.
Each of the other Shareholders will
select the particular maturity or maturities of the
Bonds to be received by him or her at Closing and give
notice to the Shareholders' Agent not less than twenty
(20) days before Closing, whereupon the Shareholders'
Agent will advise the Authority, at least fifteen (15)
days before Closing, of the maturity or maturities of
the Bonds selected by each of these Shareholders.
(f) In addition, each of the Shareholders who
elect to receive some of the Bonds at Closing, will
have the rignt to require the Authority, at the sole
option of the electing Shareholder and subject to the
existence on the prepayment date specified below, of a
higher federal tax rate and the availability of funds
in a reserve account for the Bonds, as described below,
to prepay, in whole or in part, the principal amount of
the Bonds held by the electing Shareholder at any time
on or after the eleventh Annual Payment Date, at a
repayment price equal to the principal amount being
prepaid plus accrued interest to the date of prepayment.
As used herein, the phrase "higher federal tax
rate" shall mean a federal income tax rate increase,
of not less than seven percent (7%) of the federal
income tax rate applicable at the end of the previous
tax year applicable to the Shareholder exercising such
option. The electing Shareholders will be able to exercise this option only if: (i) it will allow them to be
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taxed for federal income tax purposes at a lower rate
than the higher federal tax rate; and (ii) the aggregate amount of prepayments to be made to all electing
Shareholders does not exceed the maximum amount which
may be held as of the date of Closing in a reserve
account for the holders of the Bonds at an unrestricted
yield without impairing the exemption of interest on
the Bonds from federal income taxation (such amount to
be specified in the Related Documents) and does not
violate any applicable law of the State; such prepayment shall be made on a prorata basis to electing
Shareholders if the funds in the reserve account are
insufficient to prepay the entire principal amount of
the Bonds held by electing Shareholders.
Section 2.7 Clos i nq. The Closing for the purchase of
the Shares and the issuance of the Bonds will be on December 30f
1991, or fifteen (15) days after the date the PSC Order has
become final and nonappealable, whichever is earlier, unless
extended by the parties hereto in writing.
ARTICLE III.

THE BONDS; SECURITY FOR THE BONDS; BOND
PAYMENTS; DOCUMENTATION

Section
3.1
Issuance of Bonds; Collateral.
The
Authority shall issue the Bonds pursuant to the Act and shall
enter into the Lease and Assignment with the City pursuant to the
Act for the lease of the System and assignment of beneficial ownership rights in the Company to the City, subject to the payment
of Lease Payments at least sufficient in amount to pay the principal of and interest on the Bonds as they come due; provided,
however, that the City's obligations to make annual Lease Payments under the Lease and Assignment each year are subject to
annual budget and appropriation for such purpose by the City
Council and shall be terminated in an event of nonappropriation
under the Lease and Assignment. The obligation of the Authority
to the Shareholders represented by the Bonds shall be secured by
the Security.
The Authority and the City shall deliver to the
Shareholders at Closing an opinion of Bond Counsel that the Stock
Pledge Agreement, Deed of Trust and Security Agreement and any
other mortgages, deeds of trust, pledge agreements and security
agreements creating these liens and security interests are the
valid and legally binding obligations of, and are legally
enforceable against, the Authority and the City.
Section 3.2
Costs of Issuance of the Bonds.
The
Authority will pay all costs of issuance of the Bonds; provided
that the fees and costs of counsel for the Shareholders will not
be deemed to be costs of issuance of the Bonds for this purpose.
Section 3.3
Payments of the Bonds.
All payments
required to be paid by the Authority on the Bonds shall be made
to the Trustee for the benefit of the Bondholders. The Indenture
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will prescribe the maturities for the Bonds, the i'nterest payment
dates (as provided herein) and the manner in which the amounts
received by the Trustee will be paid by the Trustee to the
Bondholders.
Section 3.4 Documentation. The Authority and the City
agree to negotiate and enter into the Lease and Assignment, the
Indenture, the Stock Pledge Agreement, Deed of Trust and Security
Agreement and other Related Documents and agreements as are
needed or appropriate to document and carry out the terms and
conditions of this transaction, including, without limitation,
all other agreements, certificates and documents reasonably
required by Bond Counsel or the Shareholders in connection with
the Closing.
The terms and conditions of this Agreement, the
Related Documents and all other transaction documents will comply
with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, relating to installment sale transactions, and applicable regulations and rulings thereunder, as well as all other
applicable laws, to allow the transaction to be treated as an
installment sale by the Shareholders for income tax purposes;
provided however, the Authority and City make no representation,
warranty or guarantee as to whether the Shareholders may report
the sale of the Shares on the installment method for federal
income tax purposes.
The Indenture shall provide that the
Authority will pay all fees, expenses and other charges of the
Trustee (including, without limitation, its fees, expenses and
charges as Escrow Agent) under the Indenture.
ARTICLE IV.

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF THE
PARTIES

Section 4.1
Representations and Warranties of the
Shareholders. Each of the Shareholders, for himself or herself,
represents and warrants to the Authority and the City that, as of
the date of Closing:
(a) The Company is a corporation duly incorporated and validly existing and in good standing under
the laws of the State.
(b) The Shares constitute one hundred percent
(100%) of the capital stock of the Company issued and
outstanding on the date of this Agreement and on the
date of Closing.
(c) The number of the Shares indicated adjacent
to his or her name on Exhibit C hereto are owned by him
or her free and clear of any liens or encumbrances.
(d) This Agreement, when executed and delivered
by the Shareholder making this representation, and
assuming due authorization, execution and delivery by
the other parties hereto, will constitute a legal,
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valid
and
binding
obligation
of
such
Shareholder
enforceable against such Shareholder in accordance with
its terms, subject to the qualification that enforceability may be limited by applicable bankruptcy, insolvency,
reorganization,
moratorium
or
similar
laws
affecting the enforcement of creditors 1 rights and by
general principles of equity.
(e) The Company has duly made and filed all tax
returns and other reports required by law to be filed
with the federal government and with all state and
local governments to the laws of which it is subject.
All Company income taxes for all years through December
31, 1990, have been paid.
(f) The Company has complied with all applicable
federal and state laws relating to the employment of
labor, including the provisions thereof relating to
wages, collective bargaining, and the payment of Social
Security taxes, and is not liable for any arrears of
wages or any tax or penalties for failure to comply
with any of the foregoing laws. There are no material
controversies, pending or threatened, between the Company and its employees.
(g) The
Company
has
no
claims,
litigation,
actions or suits or proceedings pending or threatened
against it or its property in any court or before any
governmental agency, other than the proceedings before
the PSC referred to in Section 7.1 of this Agreement,
and that threatened litigation referred to in a letter
dated July 17, 1991 from Haley & Stoleberger, representing Paulina Flint and others, to the White City
Water Company Board of
Directors, a copy of which has
been given to all parties hereto.
(h) The Company has all right, title and interest
represented by the Certificates of Water Appropriation
listed on Exhibit F and the Applications for Water
Appropriation
listed on Exhibit G, subject
to the
rights of prior beneficial users, and such restrictions
as may be imposed by state or federal law or noted of
record in the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder,
the State Engineer, or the records of the Company, and
the liens and security interests held by the Shareholders pursuant to this Agreement.
(i) The Authority shall have sixty (60) days from
the date of execution of this Agreement to inspect the
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder, the State
Engineer, and Company pertaining to the water rights
and application for water rights to be conveyed as
stated herein.
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Section 4.2
Representations and Warranties of the
Authority and the City.
The Authority and the City, each for
itself, represents and warrants to the Shareholders, as follows:
(a) The Authority is a duly organized and validly
existing building ownership authority of the City, created pursuant to the Act and a resolution of the City
Council of the City duly adopted on April 5, 1988.
(b) The execution and delivery of this Agreement,
the Bonds and each of the Related Documents and other
agreements, instruments, certificates and documents to
be executed and delivered by the Authority and/or the
City in connection with this transaction have been (or
will be prior to Closing) duly authorized by all necessary
action
of
the
Authority
or
the
City,
as
• appropriate.
(c) This Agreement, the Bonds, the Related Documents and any other agreements or instruments to be
executed by the Authority, when executed and delivered
by the Authority, and assuming due authorization, execution
and delivery
thereof
by
the other
parties
thereto, will constitute legal, valid and binding obligations
of
the
Authority
enforceable
against
the
Authority in accordance with their terms, subject to
the qualification that enforceability may be limited by
applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, moratorium or similar laws affecting the enforcement of
creditors' rights and by general principles of equity.
(d) No authorization or approval of, or other
action by, and no notice to or filing with, any Governmental Authority is required to be obtained or made by
the Authority or the City, except for City Council and
Authority
resolutions authorizing
the execution
and
delivery of the Lease and Assignment and the issuance
of the Bonds, and the other transactions contemplated
herein, for the due execution, delivery and performance
by the Authority and the City of this Agreement, the
Bonds and the Related Documents other than such as have
been obtained and are in full force and effect, and
except as specified in Section 7.1 of this Agreement.
(e) No litigation, investigation or proceeding of
or before any arbitrator or Governmental Authority is
pending or, to the knowledge of the Authority or the
City, is threatened by or against the Authority or the
City (i) with respect to or affecting this Agreement,
the Bonds or any Related Documents or any of the transactions contemplated hereby or thereby, or (ii) in
which there is a reasonable possibility of an adverse
determination that would materially adversely affect
the ability of the Authority or the City to meet their
-12-

respective obligations hereunder and under the Bonds
and the Related Documents, other than proceedings
before the PSC as referred to in Section 7.1 of this
Agreement, and other than that threatened litigation
referred to in a letter, dated July 17, 1991, from
Haley & Stoleberger, representing Paulina Flint and
others, to the White City Water Company Board of Directors, a copy of which has been delivered to all parties
hereto.
(f) Neither the Authority nor the City will take
any action or fail to take any action needed to be
taken which would impair (i) the exemption of interest
on the Bonds from federal income taxation and Utah
individual income taxation or (ii) the treatment of the
sale of the Shares by the Shareholders as an installment sale for federal and state income tax purposes.
(g) Neither the Authority nor the City will make
an election under Section 338 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended, without the express written
consent of the Shareholders.
Section 4.3
Further Representations and Warranties of
the Authority. The Authority further represents and warrants to
the Shareholders that:
(a) Each of the representations and warranties of
the Authority set forth in the Related Documents are
true and correct and are hereby made to the Shareholders as if set forth in full herein.
(b) Each of the representations and warranties of
the Authority set forth herein and in the Bonds and
Related Documents will be true and correct on the date
of Closing.
Section 4.4
Further Representations and Warranties of
the City. The City further represents and warrants to the Shareholders as follows:
(a) The City is a duly organized and validly
existing city of the second class under the laws of the
State.
(b) The execution and delivery of this Agreement
and each of the Related Documents and other agreements,
instruments, certificates and documents to be executed
and delivered by the City in connection with this
transaction have been (or will be prior to Closing)
duly authorized by all necessary action of the City.
(c) This Agreement, the Related Documents and any
other agreements or instruments to be executed by the
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City, when executed and delivered by the City and
assuming
due authorization,
execution
and
delivery
thereof by the other parties thereto, will constitute
legal, valid
and binding
obligations
of
the
City
enforceable against the City in accordance with their
terms, subject to the qualifications that enforceability may be limited by applicable bankruptcy, insolvency,
reorganization,
moratorium
or
similar
laws
affecting the enforcement of creditors' rights and by
general principles of equity.
(d) Each of the representations and warranties of
the City set forth in the Related Documents are true
and correct and are hereby made to the Shareholders as
if set forth in full herein.
(e) Each of the representations and warranties of
the City set forth herein and in the Related Documents
will be true and correct on the date of Closing.

ARTICLE V.

ADDITIONAL COVENANTS AND AGREEMENTS

Section 5.1
Additional Covenants and Agreements of the
Shareholders.
The Shareholders, each for himself or herself,
agree and covenant that:
(a) They will deliver the Closing Date Audited
Financial Statements to the Authority and the City
within
a
reasonable
time,
but
not
less
than
seventy-five (75) days after the Closing.
(b) While good faith negotiations are progressing, but no later than the date set for the Closing,
neither the Company nor the Shareholders will solicit
or pursue negotiations for the possible sale of the
Shares or the Company to or with any other parties.
The Company will not dispose of or encumber any of its
assets, nor enter into any obligations greater than
$10,000, without the written concurrence of the Authority and the City.
(c) Prior to Closing, the Company will provide to
the Authority and the City access to all records of the
Company including, but not limited to, records evidencing
compliance
with
all
governmental
regulations,
financial obligations of the Company, any outstanding
lawsuits in which the Company is involved, employment
and other contracts to which the Company is a party,
and evidence that one hundred percent (100%) of the
stock of the Company, as represented by the Shares, is
held by the Shareholders.
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Section 5.2 Additional Covenants and Agreements of the
Authority and the Citv.
The Authority and the City, each for
itself, agree and covenant that:
(a)
Interest on the Bonds shall be exempt from
federal income taxation and Utah individual income taxation and opinions of Bond Counsel stating these facts
and conclusions shall be delivered to each of the
Shareholders receiving any such bonds at the time they
are delivered to such Shareholders.
(b) In order to protect the security of the Bondholders represented by the pledge of and lien on the
Shares and the lien on the System pursuant to the
Related Documents, the Authority and the City agree,
while any of the Bonds are outstanding, that:
(i) neither the City nor the Authority will,
without the prior written consent of the Shareholders holding a majority of the Shares, merge,
consolidate or liquidate the Company, or encumber,
transfer or otherwise dispose of or cancel the
Shares, or, except in the usual course of business
and then only if, and limited to the extent that,
it benefits the System, encumber, transfer or otherwise dispose of the assets of the Company, in an
aggregate amount not exceeding $15,000, or take
any other action, or fail to take any reasonable
action needed to be taken, which would impair the
Security.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Shareholders
acknowledge
and
agree that the
Authority and/or the City has the right to utilize
the System, including the water rights therein, on
an annual lease basis from the Company upon such
terms as the Company may determine; provided that
any failure to make payments under such lease
shall be an "Event of Default" under Section
6.1(b) of the Indenture; provided further that,
upon the failure of the City to make such lease
payments, the Authority shall take all actions
required by law or otherwise to cause such lease
to be completely terminated with no remaining
obligations on the part of the lessor or successor
thereto not later than the end of the sixty (60)
day period referred to in Section 6.1(b).
(ii) any new water connections made in the
area shown on Exhibit D attached hereto shall be
made to the System and shall be deemed incorporated within the System/
(iii)
the Company, City and the Authority
will maintain and operate the System under the
same standards and level of maintenance as the
City applies to its water system and as required
-15-

under all applicable governmental 'rules and regulations; and
(iv) the Company, the City and the Authority
will take all actions necessary or otherwise
appropriate and as required by law to protect and
preserve all water rights held by the Company on
the date of Closing.
(c) Any new connections, improvements, additions
or extensions to the System shall be deemed incorporated into the System, with no rights of any kind with
respect thereto to be retained by the City or the
Authority in the event the Shareholders should be
required to foreclose their liens and security interests in the Shares and the System and repossess the
same.
(d)
In the event that ownership of the Shares
and/or the System is returned to the Shareholders or
the Trustee because of any default or other action or
inaction by the City or the Authority under the Bonds,
this Agreement or the Related Documents, and regardless
whether such return is brought about by foreclosure or
other legal proceedings or otherwise, the Authority and
the City (i) will take all reasonable actions as shall
be necessary or appropriate to restore to the Shareholders their rights and privileges in the Shares of
the Company and all of their rights and privileges with
respect to the System, including, such rights and privileges that existed as of the date of Closing, provided
that the foregoing shall not serve to limit additional
rights and privileges to which the Company or the
Shareholders may be entitled under the terms of this
Agreement,
the Bonds, or the Related
Documents;
(ii) will provide water storage facilities to the Company as the case may be; (iii) to the extent permitted
by law, will forfeit the interest of the Authority and
the City in the Shares and the System; and (iv) will
vote any of the Shares in which the City or the Authority is legally entitled to retain an interest to elect
directors nominated by the Shareholders.
(e) The
Company,
Authority
and
City
shall
endeavor to retain the Employees with the same policies, benefits and other employee procedures as apply
to other similarly situated employees of the City.
(f) After the Authority purchases the Shares, the
Company, Authority and the City will honor the prior
commitment of the Company to provide up to one hundred
(100) residential water connections to the Magna
Investment
& Development,
Ltd.,
at nine
hundred
-16-

ninety five dollars ($995) per connection, six of which
will be provided to White Investment Company on Lots 1
through 6 of White City Number 53 Subdivision.
The
obligation to honor such commitment shall continue for
the period beginning on the date of Closing and ending
on the second anniversary of such date.
VI.

EVENTS OF DEFAULT: REMEDIES

Section 6.1 Events of Default. Each of the following
events shall constitute and is referred to in this Agreement as
an "Event of Default":
(a) a failure by the City to make when due any
Lease Payment, which failure shall have resulted in an
"Event of Default" under the Indenture;
(b) a failure by any party hereto to pay when due
any amount required to be paid by the party under this
Agreement or to observe and perform any covenant, condition or agreement on its part to be observed or performed (other than a failure described in clause (a) of
this Section), which failure shall continue for a
period of sixty (60) days (or such longer period as the
non-defaulting party or parties may agree to in writing, the Trustee being authorized to act for the Bondholders for such purpose) after written notice, specifying such failure and requesting that it be remedied,
shall have been given to the defaulting party or parties by any one or more of the non-defaulting party or
parties; provided that if such failure is other than
for the payment of money and is of such nature that it
cannot be corrected within the applicable period, such
failure shall not constitute an "Event of Default" so
long as the defaulting party or parties institute corrective action within the applicable period and such
action is being diligently pursued;
(c)

any event of default under the Indenture;

(d) any event of default under any of the other
Related Documents;
(e) the dissolution or liquidation of the Authority or the City; or the filing by the Authority or the
City of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy; or failure
by the Authority or the City promptly to lift or bond
any execution, garnishment or attachment of such consequence as will impair its ability to make any payments
under this Agreement; or the filing of a Petition or
answer proposing the entry of an order for relief by a
court of competent jurisdiction against the Authority
or the City under Title 11 of the United States Code,
-17-

as the same may from time to time be he'reafter amended,
or proposing the reorganization, arrangement or debt
readjustment of the Authority or the City under the
provisions of any bankruptcy act or under any similar
act which may be hereafter enacted and the failure of
said petition or answer to be discharged or denied
within ninety (90) days after the filing thereof; or
the entry of an order for relief by a court of competent jurisdiction in any proceeding for the Authority's
or the City's liquidation or reorganization under the
provisions of any bankruptcy act or under any similar
act which may be hereafter enacted; or an assignment by
the Authority or the City for the benefit of its creditors; or the entry by the Authority or the City into an
agreement of composition with its creditors.
Section 6.2

Remedies.

(a)
Upon the occurrence and continuance of any
Event of Default, the non-defaulting party or parties
(the Trustee being authorized to act for the Bondholders for this purpose) may take any action at law or in
equity to collect any payments then due and thereafter
to become due hereunder or to seek injunctive relief or
specific performance of any obligation, agreement or
covenant hereunder.
(b) No remedy conferred upon or reserved to any
party hereby is intended to be exclusive of any other
available remedy or remedies, but each and every such
remedy shall be cumulative and shall be in addition to
every other remedy given hereunder or now or hereafter
existing at law or in equity or by statute. No delay
or omission to exercise any right or power accruing
upon any Event of Default shall impair any such right
or power or shall be construed to be a waiver thereof,
but any such right or power may be exercised from time
to time and as often as may be deemed expedient.
In
order to entitle a party to exercise any remedy
reserved to it in this Article VI, it shall not be necessary to give any notice, other than such notice as
may be herein expressly required.
(c) If any party shall employ attorneys or incur
other reasonable and proper expenses for the collection
of payments due hereunder or for the enforcement of
performance or observance of any obligation or agreement hereunder on the part of another party or parties
hereto, the defaulting party or parties shall reimburse
the non-defaulting party for the reasonable and proper
fees of such attorneys and such other reasonable
expenses so incurred.
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(d)
In the event any obligation created hereby
shall be breached by any of the parties hereto and such
breach shall thereafter be waived by the other party or
parties, such waiver shall be limited to the particular
breach so waived and shall not be deemed to waive any
other breach hereunder.
Section 6.3
Assiqnment Obiigat ion.

Limitations on the Bonds and

Lease and

(a)
The Bonds are issued under and pursuant to
the Act and shall be limited and not general obligations of the Authority payable solely out of the Revenues.
No holder of any Bond has the right to compel
any exercise of the taxing power of the City to pay the
principal of, or premium, if any, on the Bonds when due
and the interest thereon, or the purchase price of any
Bond. The Bonds shall not constitute or give rise to a
pecuniary liability of the Authority or constitute an
indebtedness of or a charge against the general credit
of the Authority or a loan of credit thereof within the
meaning of any constitutional or statutory provisions
of the State. The Authority has no tax power. Neither
the Authority nor any member or officer of the Authority nor any person executing the Bonds shall be liable
personally on the Bonds or be subject to any personal
liability or accountability by reason of the issuance
of the Bonds.
(b) The Authority's payment obligations under the
Bonds shall be limited to and payable exclusively from
the Revenues and the Security, including the Lease Payments which shall be a current expense of the City payable exclusively from City funds to the extent they are
budgeted and annually appropriated for such purpose by
the City Council. The City Council shall be under no
obligation to provide such funds if not appropriated in
the City's final budget, neither shall the City be
obligated to make such appropriation. The Bonds shall
be limited obligations of the Authority, payable solely
out of the Revenues received by the Authority under the
Lease and Assignment and from the other Security. Pursuant to the Act, the Bonds shall be secured by the
Security which shall be specially mortgaged, pledged,
hypothecated, assigned and otherwise secured pursuant
to the Related Documents for the equal and ratable payment of the principal of and interest on the Bonds.
Neither the full faith and credit nor the taxing power
of the Authority or the City are pledged to the payment
of the principal of or interest on the Bonds.
The
Bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness of the
Authority or the City within the meaning of any state
constitutional provision or limitation nor give rise to
a general obligation or liability of, nor a charge
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against, the general or taxing powers of the Authority
or the City (the Authority has no tax powers) •
The
Lease and Assignment will provide that the City, as
lessee, will
include
in its annual
appropriation
request to the City Council, the amount necessary to
pay the annual Lease Payments under the Lease and
Assignment and that if the City fails to pay such
annual Lease Payments within the cure time period provided for Events of Default as defined under the Lease
and Assignment, it shall immediately quit and vacate
the System and its annual Lease Payment obligation
thereunder shall terminate. No deficiency judgment may
be entered against the Authority or the City on foreclosure of any.lien created by the Related Documents or
otherwise securing the Bonds.
Neither the State, the
City, or any other political subdivision, board, commission, agency or department of the State, other than
the Authority, will be obligated to pay the principal
of, or interest on, the Bonds.
ARTICLE VII.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING

Prior to Closing, the following shall have occurred:
Section 7.1
PSC Order. The PSC shall have issued an
order which has become final and non-appealable, acceptable to
the City, in its sole discretion, including at least the following :
(a)
authorizing the sale of the Shares by the
Shareholders to the Authority;
(b) confirming that subsequent to the Closing the
PSC will not have jurisdiction over the rates, fees,
charges, services or practices of the Company, the
Authority or the City as a result of the purchase of
the Shares by the Authority, or the lease of the System
by the City under the Lease and Assignment; and
(c) contain no restrictions or conditions on possible reorganizations of the Company,
including a
requirement to liquidate the Company.
Section 7.2 Documents to be Provided By the Company to
the Authority and the City.
The Company shall have provided to
the Authority and the City for their examination, originals or
true copies of the following:
(a) documents which establish the Company's ownership of all water rights utilized by the Company;
(b)
salary
Company; and

schedules
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for

the employees

of

the

(c) the documents establishing the Company's commitment for water connections to Magna Investment &
Development, Ltd., referred to in Section 5.2(f),
VIII.

DOCUMENTS TO BE DELIVERED AT CLOSING

At Closing, executed originals or photocopies of the
following documents shall be delivered to each of the parties and
their representatives, as shown on the Closing Memorandum for
this transaction to be prepared by Bond Counsel:
(1)

this Agreement;

(2)

the Indenture;

(3)

the Lease and Assignment;

(4)

the Deed of Trust and Security Agreement;

(5)

the Stock Pledge Agreement;

(6)

a certified copy of the PSC Order;

(7) an unqualified opinion of Bond Counsel stating
that each of the Bonds and Related Documents are valid and
legally binding obligations of and are enforceable against the
Authority and the City, as applicable, and that interest on the
Bonds (excluding the interest to the extent of the four percent
(4%) increase over the Stated Interest Rate for the Bonds for
late payments described in Section 2.5(d) hereof) is exempt from
federal income taxation and Utah individual income taxes;
(8)
(9)
Memorandum;

the opinion of counsel described in Section 3.1;
all

other

documents

listed

in

the

Closing

(10) certified copies of the Articles of Incorporation
of the Company, together with all amendments to date, and the
minute books of the meetings of the Board of Directors and the
Shareholders of the Company (including all written actions taken
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. SS 16-10-40 and 16-10-138 by the
Shareholders and Directors of the Company without a meeting) complete to the date of Closing; and
(11) the Audited Financial Statements, including the
report of the Company's auditors which report shall be prepared
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and
practices consistently applied.
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IX.

TERMINATION

In the event the transaction contemplated by this
Agreement and the Related Documents does not close on the date of
Closing, as may be extended in writing by mutual agreement of the
parties hereto, this Agreement shall terminate and have no further force or effect, except as provided in Section 10.11.
X.

MISCELLANEOUS

Section 10.1
Conf ident ialitv.
The Authority and the
City agree to keep all records, documents and other information
(written or oral) delivered or otherwise disclosed to either of
them by the Company or the Shareholders strictly confidential and
not to reveal, deliver or otherwise disclose any of such records,
documents or other information, in whole or in part, to any other
person, except as required by law, and provided that all resolutions of the City Council and the Authority pertaining to the
transactions contemplated herein, and any public transcript of
proceedings regarding the Bonds shall be matters of public record
open for public inspection. The provisions of this Section shall
survive termination of this Agreement.
Section 10.2
Limited IndemnifIcat ion . The Shareholders agree to indemnify and hold harmless the Company, the Authority and the City against all back taxes of the Company, including, but not limited to, income, property, sales, use, excise or
other taxes, if any, and interest and penalties related to such
back taxes, if any, to the extent that any such back taxes,
interest or penalties arise from taxable events occurring within
and are attributable to any period prior to the date of Closing
except for taxes accruing for the current year as disclosed in
the Closing Date Audited Financial Statements. It is understood
and agreed that all taxes of any kind and nature, whether imposed
or sought to be imposed on the Company, the Authority, the City
or any of the Shareholders, arising from taxable events, including but not limited to a liquidation of the Company, occurring on
or after the date of Closing are the responsibility of the Company, the Authority or City each of which hereby agrees to indemnify and hold harmless each of the Shareholders from and against
all such taxes, except for any taxes imposed on the Shareholders
as a result of the sale of the Shares.
Section 10.3
Assignment of Security.
The Authority
(and the City, as appropriate), shall assign to the Trustee, for
the benefit of the Bondholders, all of its right, title and
interest in or to the Security in order to create and perfect the
right, title and interest of the Trustee therein as secured party
for the benefit of the Bondholders.
Section 10.4 Further Assurances. Each of the parties
to this Agreement shall execute and deliver or cause to be executed and delivered any and all documents or legal instruments
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necessary to carry out the provisions of this Agreement and the
transaction contemplated hereby.
Section 10.5
Binding Effect.
This Agreement shall
take effect immediately and shall be binding upon the parties
hereto and their successors and assigns.
Section 10.6
governed and construed
of Utah.

Governing Law. This Agreement shall be
in accordance with the laws of the State

Section 10.7 Modifications. This Agreement may not be
modified, amended, altered or supplemented except by a written
agreement or other instrument signed by the parties hereto.
Section 10.8 Headings. Headings in this Agreement are
for convenience of reference only and shall not affect the construction or interpretation of this Agreement.
Section 10.9 Severabi1ity. In the event any provision
of this Agreement is found to be unenforceable or invalid, such
provision shall be severable from this Agreement to the extent
that it is a provision which is not essential and the absence of
which would not have prevented the parties from entering into
this Agreement.
Section 10.10
Counterparts.
This Agreement may be
executed in counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an
original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the
same document.
Section 10.11
Survival of Provisions. The provisions
of Sections 4.2(f) and (g), and 10.1 and 10.2 hereof shall survive termination of this Agreement.
Section 10.12
Not ices.
All notices provided by this
Agreement shall be given by the appropriate party or parties to
the other party or parties hereto at the following addresses or
to such other address or addresses of any party hereto as may
hereafter be designated in writing by such other party and delivered to the other parties:
If to the Authority:

Mayor
Sandy City
440 E. 8680 So.
Sandy, UT 84070
Lee Kapaloski
Parsons Behle & Latimer
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
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If to the City:

Mayor
Sandy City
440 E. 8680 So.
Sandy, Utah 84070
Lee Kapaloski
Parsons Behle & Latimer
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

If to the Shareholders:

John E. Papanikolas
2210 Walker Lane
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Ronald J. Ockey
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough
170 So. Main #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Kim

If to the Trustee:

Galbraith
Vice President and Manager,
Corporate Trust
West One Trust Company
107 South Main Street, Suite 3<
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Section 10.13 Purchase of System Subject to Approval
by the Authority and the City Council of the City. The purchase
of the System by the Authority and the related transactions contemplated herein is subject to the approval of the Authority and
the City Council of the City.
DATED this

day of

(JPJs^f>€<_

SANDY CITY, UTAH

LARRY SMITH, MAYOR

COUNTERSIGNED AND ATTESTED:

cudddz-

ASSISTANT CITY RECORDER
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, 1991.

MUNICIPAL BUILDING OWNERSHIP
AUTHORITY OF SANDY CITY, UTAH
[Authority Seal]
ATTEST:

^^^iSW^SECRETARY

V^^^^>^CHAIRMAN
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF
WATER COMPANY, INC.

; C ^ ^

&/-vt-VV-

WHITE

CITY

uy

JOHN E. PAPANIKOLAS

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
Trustee of the Nick E. Papanikolas
Trust

MARK E. PAPANIKOLAS

.f

~

7
CHRISTINE^PAPANIKOLAS
PAPANIKOLAS

b

>** •

WILLIAM MT/PAPANIKDLAS
^

V

JOHN G. PAPANIKOLAS
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GLORIA w.' HALLIDAX/ Personal
Representative of the Ada Marie
White Estate.

JOYCES W. JACKSON
L/

tiiSs,

•tC/.(Wa.^jA<

GLORIA W. HALLIDAY

HER&ERT H. HALLIDAY

INGRID E. HALLIDAY

HART H. HALLIDAY

LAURA H. PARKER

JOHN PARKER
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THE SHAREHOLDERS OF
WATER COMPANY, INC.

WHITE

CITY

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
Trustee of the Nick E. Papanikolas
Trust

MARK E. PAPANIKOLAS
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GLORIA W. HALLIDA
Representative of
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HALLIDAY
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SH
ART H. HALLIDAY
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UAS\S^
/ V.
LAURA H. PARKER
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JOHN/PARKER

HEATHER H. ALGER

^-^V^^-y/^ ^ n l ^ .
GARY AtGER

-N/ f'iA/-<,i
/9j—(Ju<iv<eY)
TERESA H. CLAWSON

COY GLA
GLAWSON

GREGORY W. HALLIDAY

MUNICIPAL BUILDING
AUTHORITY OF SANDY CITY, UTAH
[Authority Seal]
ATTEST:
SECRETARY

CHAIRMAN
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF
WATER COMPANY, INC.

WHITE

CITY

JOHN E. PAPANIKOLAS

GARY H. WHITE

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
Trustee of the Nick E. Papanikolas
Trust

MARK E. PAPANIKOLAS

CHRISTINE PAPANIKOLAS

WILLIAM M. PAPANIKOLAS

JOHN G. PAPANIKOLAS
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